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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, an intense debate has developed concerning whether 
religious beliefs should serve as a basis for political choice or political 
justification. In general, when referring to "religious" grounds of 
justification and choice, liberal theorists are referring to theistic 
beliefs-beliefs involving some notion of a deity. Robert Audi, for 
example, has stated four sufficient conditions for an argument's being 
religious, none of which are necessary conditions. These conditions 
include: that it have theistic content, such as a reference to a divine 
command (the "content criterion"); that the premises, conclusion, or both 
cannot be known, or at least justifiably accepted, apart from reliance on 
religious considerations (the "epistemic criterion"); that an essential part 
of a person's motivation for presenting the argument is to accomplish a 
religious purpose (the "motivational criterion"); and .finally, that the 
argument traces to one or more arguments that are religious in one of the 
preceding senses or to one or more propositions that are either religious 
in content or epistemically dependent on a proposition that is religious 
in content (the _"historical criterion"). 1 The debate concerning whether 
religious beliefs should serve as a basis for political choice or political 
justification focuses on whether such arguments should, as a moral 
matter, subject individuals to coercive governmental action based on 
propositions to which they cannot reasonably assent. 
Liberal theorists have answered this question concerning the proper 
role of religious beliefs in public discourse in different ways. Some 
l. See Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic 
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 679-83 (1993); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, 
RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (1997). In an 
essay drawn from his book, Professor Perry explained: 
By a "religious" argument, I mean an argument that relies, at least in part, on 
a religious belief: an argument that presupposes the truth of a religious belief 
and includes that belief as one of its essential premises. A "religious" belief 
is, for present purposes, either the belief that God exists-"God" in the sense 
of a transcendent reality that is the source, the ground, and the end of 
everything else-or a belief about the nature, activity, or will of God. 
Michael J. Perry, Religion in Politics, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 732 (1996) (footnote 
omitted). 
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scholars, such as Bruce Ackerman,2 Thomas Nagel,3 Charles Larmore,4 
and Ronald Dworkin,5 have argued that in a liberal society 
religiously-based arguments should not be employed to influence 
coercive public policy choices. Some liberal theories would allow 
religious arguments in support of coercive public policy choices as long 
as some public justification accessible to all members of society were 
also given. 6 Other liberal theorists, such as Kent Greenawalt, would 
allow religious arguments in support of political positions whenever 
secular arguments could not resolve certain issues.7 These latter 
theories recognize that it may be necessary to appeal to religious or other 
comprehensive doctrines in order to reach conclusions concerning certain 
political questions. As Michael Perry has contended, "[o]nly a politics 
in which beliefs about human good, including disputed beliefs, have a 
central place is capable of addressing our most basic political ques-
tions. "8 
Although there seems to be some consensus among liberal theorists 
that religious beliefs should not (at least in most instances) be used as 
2. See Bruce Ackerman, Neutralities, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 29 (R. 
Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990) (explaining Ackerman's "principle of conversational 
restraint"); Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. Phil 5, 17-18 (1989). 
3. See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 163 (1991) ("Legitimate 
government would be impossible if it were never legitimate to impose a policy on those 
who reasonably rejected the values on which it was based."). 
4. See CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987). 
5. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 
113-43 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). 
6. See Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 729, 748 (1993) (favoring this "principle of inclusion" because it would 
"foster civility and the civic virtue of tolerance"). 
7. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some 
Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019, 1022, 1041, 1043 (1990) (indicating that 
two borderline issues that secular reasoning is inadequate to resolve are abortion and 
animal rights issues). See also MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER 19-20 (1991) 
(noting that the distinction between secular and religious reasons is difficult to maintain); 
Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 763, 771 (1993) (arguing that secular reasons will be inadequate to resolve many 
"core issues," such as wealth distribution). 
8. PERRY, supra note 7, at 29. As Perry has noted: 
[A] practice of political justification, like Ackerman's and Nagel's practices, 
that excludes or marginalizes disputed beliefs about human good is bereft of 
the normative resources required for addressing, in more than a superficial 
way, much less resolving, the most fundamental political-moral questions that 
engage and divide us, like questions about human rights. 
Id. at 43. 
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grounds for public justification or choice, other scholars have voiced 
their concern that exclusion of religious argument from public discourse 
would have negative effects.9 For example, Professor Perry has 
suggested that some religious premises offer "strong" or even "essential" 
support for some constitutional premises. 10 William Galston has argued 
that "[i]n some measure, religion and liberal politics need each other." 11 
Richard John Neuhaus has asserted that excluding religious discours·e 
from tthe public square may lead "toward the state-as-church, toward 
totalitarianism."12 Thus, the debate concerning the proper role of 
religious beliefs in public justification and choice has produced a range 
of conflicting views. 
The approach adopted in this Article is that religious beliefs, and more 
generally, all such comprehensive doctrines, are appropriate as grounds 
for public justification and choice. Liberal theories that exclude such 
beliefs as grounds for public justification and choice invariably 
presuppose certain values to which liberal theorists claim individuals 
should "reasonably" assent. Thus, these theories tend to privilege certain 
comprehensive doctrines over others-those that prominently feature the 
values in question, which are repackaged as "political values"-although 
their authors vehemently deny this. In order to illustrate this aspect of 
liberal theories in general, this Article analyzes the views of John Rawls 
both in his recent book Political Liberalism and in subsequent work. 
Rawls attempts to escape these common objections to liberal theories by 
constructing a model of political liberalism in which political values are 
the subject of an overlapping· consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines held by members of society. However, this Article concludes 
9. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW (1988); Franklin I. 
Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 325 (1984); 
Robin W. Lovin, Naturalism and Religion in Public, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1517 (1989). 
William Marshall has concluded: 
The legitimacy of imposing special constraints upon religion's involvement in 
public decisionmaking has been forcefully attacked on a number of counts. 
It has been argued that restricting the role of religion in political 
decisionmaking (1) is artificial if not impossible; (2) undercuts society's ability 
to make informed moral and political judgments; and (3) sets forth an 
inappropriate dichotomy that forces religion and religious values to be 
"privatized" or "marginalized" in a manner that demeans religion's role in the 
life of the individual as well as in society at large. 
William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 845 (1993) 
(footnote omitted). 
10. PERRY, supra note 7, at 137. 
11. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY 
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 279 (1991). 
12. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 89 (1984). 
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that Rawls fails to escape the traditional objections to liberal theories. 
In order to illustrate that the problems in Rawls's model, and liberal 
models in general, can be overcome, an alternatiye. liberal model is 
developed in which religious beliefs, and more ··generally, all such 
comprehensive doctrines, may play a role in public justification and 
choice. 
Part II of this Article explores the liberal theory that John Rawls 
presents in his book, Political Liberalism. Part III examines several of 
the assumptions underlying liberal theories. Several commentators have 
argued that adoption of these assumptions dictates the exclusion of 
religious beliefs as grounds for public justification or choice. However, 
such assumptions are not necessary to all "liberal" theories. Part IV 
analyzes the implications of these assumptions, This Article concludes 
that even if one accepts the assumptions of liberal models such as that 
of Rawls, these assumptions do not necessitate exclusion of religious and 
other comprehensive beliefs as grounds for public justification and 
choice. Part V builds on the work of Larry Alexander in arguing that 
religious and nonreligious beliefs are epistemologically equivalent; 
therefore, any epistemological distinction between religious and 
nonreligious beliefs may not serve as an argument for exclusion of 
religious beliefs as grounds for public justification and choice. Finally, 
Part VI develops a proposal for an alternative· model governing the role 
of comprehensive doctrines in public discourse, suggesting that the 
public square be viewed both as being composed of a variety of 
:fluctuating subdialogues rather than a single dialogue among all of the 
members of society, and as focusing on the moral rights and duties of 
the listener in a liberal society. Either of these approaches independent-
ly allows for the utilization of religious or other comprehensive doctrines 
as grounds for public justification or choice, while avoiding the 
concomitant problems of social instability and subjecting individuals to 
coercive governmental action based on premises to which they cannot 
reasonably assent. 
II. RAWLS'S POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
In his recent book, Political Liberalism, John Rawls presents his view 
of society as being a "fair and stable system of cooperation."13 Rawls 
13. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 44 (1993). 
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argues that there are three conditions that are sufficient for a given 
society to be a "fair and stable system of cooperation between free and 
equal citizens who are deeply divided by the reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines they affirm." 14 Rawls summarizes these conditions as 
follows: 
First, the basic structure of society is regulated by a political conception of 
justice; second, this political conception is the focus of an overlapping 
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines; and third, public discussion, 
when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at stake, is 
conducted in terms of the political conception of justice. 15 
By making public reason the subject of an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the goal of social stability is 
furthered and the problem of subjecting citizens to coercive governmen-
tal action based on premises to which they cannot reasonably assent is 
avoided. 16 Rawls defines the word "reasonable" indirectly by describ-
ing "its two basic aspects as virtues of persons."17 According to Rawls, 
"[:f]or the purposes of a political conception of justice, I give the 
reasonable a more restricted sense and associate it, first, with the 
willingness to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation, and second, 
with the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Rawls argues that the overlapping consensus is distinct from a modus vivendi 
for two reasons: 
[F]irst, the object of the consensus, the political conception of justice, is itself 
a moral conception. And second, it is affirmed on moral grounds, that is, it 
includes conceptions of society and of citizens as persons, as well as principles 
of justice, and an account of the political virtues through which those 
principles are embodied in human character and expressed in public life. 
Id. at 147. Rawls argues that, because of this difference, the overlapping consensus 
results in greater stability. Id. at 147-48. According to Rawls, the stability reached under 
a modus vivendi "depend[s] on happenstance and a balance of relative forces," whereas 
the stability achieved under an overlapping consensus does not. Id. at 148. Indeed, 
Rawls contends that this is the way in which law is made "legitimate": 
Thus, when on a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, all 
appropriate government officials act from and follow public reason, and when 
all reasonable citizens think of themselves ideally as if they were legislators 
following public reason, the legal enactment expressing the opinion of the 
majority is legitimate law. It may not be thought the most reasonable, or the 
most appropriate, by each, but it is politically (morally) binding on him or her 
as a citizen and is to be accepted as such. Each thinks that all have spoken 
and voted at least reasonably, and therefore all have followed public reason 
and honored their duty of civility. 
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 770-71 
(1997). 
17. Jesse Furman, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and 
the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197, 1204 (1997). 
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their consequences."18 Thus, Rawls makes a distinction between 
"reasonableness" and "rationality," the former being characterized by a 
willingness to cooperate with other members of society. 
Although Rawls does not make a distinction between religious and 
secular justifications, he does make a distinction between public and 
18. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 48-49 n.l. Rawls has stated: 
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a 
system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one 
another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most 
reasonable conception of political justice; and when they agree to act on those 
terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided 
that other citizens also accept those terms. The criterion of reciprocity requires 
that when those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair 
cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for 
others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or 
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position. 
Citizens will of course differ as to which conceptions of political justice they 
think the most reasonable, but they will agree that all are reasonable, even if 
barely so. 
Rawls, supra note 16, at 770 (footnote omitted). Michael Perry, although he later moved 
to a more inclusivist model of public justification, outlined two similar criteria of public 
justification that he contended were "essential" to the practice of what he termed 
"ecumenical political dialogue." PERRY, supra note 7, at 100. These two criteria he 
termed "fallibilism" and "pluralism." Id. According to Perry: 
To be a fallibilist is essentially to embrace the ideal of self-critical rationality. 
To be a pluralist, in the sense relevant here, is to understand that a morally 
pluralistic context, with its attendant variety of ways of life, can often be a 
more fertile source of deepening moral insight-in particular, a more fertile 
soil for dialogue leading to deepening moral insight-than can a monistic 
context. 
Id. (endnotes omitted). Thus, under these criteria Perry declined to distinguish between 
controversial religious beliefs as grounds for public justification and choice and 
controversial nonreligious beliefs. Both categories of beliefs were equally subject to 
application of these criteria. Perry subjected beliefs used as a basis for public 
justification and choice to what he termed "the virtue of public accessibility." Michael 
J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 599, 604 (1992). 
Professor Perry, however, has since rejected placing even these more limited constraints 
on the grounds employed in public justification and choice. In response to David 
Smolin, Perry admits that "perhaps meaningful participation in ecumenical political 
dialogue is possible even for those who are not fallibilists or pluralists." PERRY, supra 
note 7, at 140. Furthermore, Professor Perry has recently stated: "I now see that we 
Americans should not accept any exclusivist ideal, either of public political argument or 
of political choice-not even any 'middle ground' ideal." Michael J. Perry, Religious 
Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts-and Second Thoughts-on Love. and 
Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703, 713 (1993) [hereinafter Perry, Further Thoughts]. 
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nonpublic reasons. 19 According to Rawls, "[n]onpublic reasons 
comprise the many reasons of civil society and belong to what I have 
called the 'background culture,' in contrast with the public political 
culture."20 Although one might well inquire about the bounds of the 
public sphere and the nonpublic sphere, Rawls seems to give us no clear 
answer.21 For Rawls, however, religious beliefs clearly fall within the 
sphere of the nonpublic. They are just a species of comprehensive 
doctrine, in Rawls's parlance. Thus, comprehensive doctrines include 
not only religious, but also other all-encompassing world views, such as 
certain philosophical views.22 
Within the public square, Rawls advocates basing argumentation and 
choice on public reasons-"the plain truths now widely accepted, or 
available, to citizens generally"23 or "the ideals and principles expressed 
by society's conception of political justice."24 Among these public 
reasons are the "conclusions· of science when these are not controver-
sial."25 Rawls restricts the sphere in which the ideal of public reason 
is to govern to questions "involving what we may call 'constitutional 
essentials' and questions of basic justice," rather than to "all political 
questions."26 However, he does not provide any method for distin-
19. Lawrence Solum has observed that the distinction between religious and 
secular arguments does not map directly onto the distinction between public and 
nonpublic reasons because certain religious reasons may be public, while certain secular 
reasons may be nonpublic. See Solum, supra note 6, at 741. 
20. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 220. See also Rawls, supra note 16, at 765 ("The 
idea of public reason, as I understand it, belongs to a conception of a well ordered 
constitutional democratic society. The form and content of this reason-the way it is 
understood by citizens and how it interprets their political relationship-is part of the 
idea of democracy itself.") (footnote omitted); id. at 766 ("The idea of public reason 
specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to determine 
a constitutional democratic government's relation to its citizens and their relation to one 
another."); id. at 775 ("We must distinguish public reason from what is sometimes 
referred to as secular reason and secular values. These are not the same as public 
reason. For I define secular reason as reasoning in terms of comprehensive nonreligious 
doctrines. Such doctrines and values are much too broad to serve the purposes of public 
reason."). 
21. According to Lawrence Solum, the distinction between the public and 
nonpublic relates to what he terms the "domain of deliberation and discussion to which 
an ideal of public reason might be applied." Solum, supra note 6, at 737. 
22. Professor Greenawalt defines a comprehensive view as including "any 
overarching philosophy of life, whether religious or not." Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for 
Political Judgment: The Status of Personal Experience and the Autonomy and Generality 
of Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 647, 648 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
23. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 225. 
24. Id. at 213. 
25. Id. at 224. 
26. Id. at 214. Rawls states that there are two kinds of constitutional essentials: 
"fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government" and "the 
political process and equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative 
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guishing between constitutional essentials, which are subject to a 
principle of conversational self-restraint, and ordinary political issues to 
which such restraint does not apply.27 Rawls means the ideal of public 
reason to extend to both public argument and the making of public 
choices.28 According to Rawls, "the limits imposed by public reason 
majorities are to respect." Id. at 227. Rawls enumerates the following as illustrations 
of constitutional essentials: "who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be 
tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property. These 
and similar questions are the special subject of public reason." Id. at 214. These 
exemplars are strikingly similar to American constitutional essentials, which causes one 
to question the purpose of Rawls's project. Is the objective to construct a model of 
liberal democracy, or merely to justify or perhaps shape American democracy? 
Rawls also states that he is not against extending the ideal of public reason to political 
questions that do not involve constitutional essentials. According to Rawls: 
[M]y aim is to consider first the strongest case where the political questions 
concern the most fundamental matters. If we should not honor the limits of 
public reason here, it would seem we need not honor them anywhere. Should 
they hold here; we can then proceed to other cases. Still, I grant that it is 
usually highly desirable to settle political questions by invoking the values of 
public reason. 
Id. at 215. However, one might well ask why the ideal of public reason is not extended 
to political questions that do not involve constitutional essentials. Rawls seems to give 
no good reason for not extending the ideal of public reason to all political discourse. 
See Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 669 (arguing that the "suggestion of different 
permissible grounds of justification for 'constitutional' and other issues is impractical") 
(footnote omitted). 
27. See Kent Greenawalt, On Public Reason, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 686 
(1994). Greenawalt has noted that argument concerning constitutional essentials often 
has implications for issues that are merely ordinary political issues. Greenawalt provides 
the example of the abortion debate influencing the debate on fetal tissue research. Id. 
at 686-87. Furthermore, Greenawalt observes that it is problematic that different 
considerations will exist depending upon whether an issue is classified as a constitutional 
essential or merely as an ordinary political issue. Id. at 686. However, as previously 
noted, Rawls seems to envision expanding the application of his liberal principle of 
legitimacy to ordinary political issues as well as to constitutional essentials 
28. See RAWLS, supra note 13, at 215-16. According to Rawls: 
Another feature of public reason is that its limits do not apply to our personal 
deliberations and reflections about political questions, or to the reasoning about 
them by members of associations such as churches and universities, all of 
which is a vital part of the background culture. Plainly, religious, philosophi-
cal, and moral considerations of many kinds may here properly play a role. 
But the ideal of public reason does hold for citizens when they engage in 
political advocacy in the public forum, and thus for members of political 
parties and for candidates in their campaigns and for other groups who support 
them. It holds equally for how citizens are to vote in elections when 
constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice are at stake. Thus, the ideal 
of public reason not only governs the public discourse of elections insofar as 
the issues involve those fundamental questions, but also how citizens are to 
1579 
do not apply to all political questions but only to those involving what 
we may call 'constitutional essentials' and questions of basic justice."29 
Rawls privileges political values over all other values derived from 
comprehensive doctrines. With respect to questions concerning constitu-
tional essentials and matters of basic justice, "the political values 
expressed by [the constitutional regime's] principles and ideals normally 
have sufficient weight to override all other values that may come in 
conflict with them."30 According to Rawls:· 
The point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their 
fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a 
political conception of justice based on values that the others can reasonably be 
expected to endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that 
conception so understood. This means that each of us must have, and be ready 
to explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think other citizens 
(who are also free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along with 
us. We must have some test we are ready to state as to when this condition is 
met.31 
cast their vote on these questions. Otherwise, public discourse runs the risk 
of being hypocritical: citizens talk before one another one way and vote 
another. , . . [T]he ideal of public reason . . . applies in official forums and 
so to legislators when they speak on the floor of parliament, and to the 
executive in its public acts and pronouncements. 
Id. See also Rawls, supra note 16, at 766 ("I propose that in public reason comprehen-
sive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable 
addressed to citizens as citizens."). Rawls, however, specifies that the idea of public 
reason extends only to such discussions occurring in the "public forum": 
It is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason does not apply to all 
political discussions of fundamental questions, but only to discussions of those 
questions in what I refer to as.the public political forum. This forum may be 
divided into three parts: the discourse of judges in their decisions, and 
especially of the judges of a supreme court; the discourse of government 
officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and finally, the discourse 
of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, especially in their 
public oratory, party platforms, and political statements. . . . Distinct and 
separate from this three-part public political forum is what I call the 
background culture. . . . The idea of public reason does not apply to the 
background culture with its many forms of nonpublic reason nor to media of 
any kind. 
Id. at 767-68 (footnotes omitted). 
29. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 214. Rawls does not preclude application of the 
ideal of public reason in the broader context of all political discourse. Rawls states that 
his "aim is to consider first the strongest case where·the political questions concern the 
most fundamental matters." Id. at 215. 
30. Id. at 138. 
31. Id. at 226. Elsewhere, Rawls states: 
[D]istinct from the idea of public reason ... is the ideal of public reason. 
This ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief 
executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public 
office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other 
citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political positions in terms 
of the political conception of justice they regard as the most reasonable. In 
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By adhering to this "discipline" of public reason, citizens may avoid 
coercing their fellow citizens based upon unshared or inaccessible beliefs 
and thereby promote social unity. In order to attain the goal of social 
unity in the face of "the fact of reasonable pluralism," Rawls posits his 
"liberal principle of legitimacy," which precludes the exercise of 
coercive political power over citizens on the basis of nonpublic reasons. 
Citizens may properly exercise political power only when "it is exercised 
in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational."32 The liberal principle 
of legitimacy flows from the ideal of citizenship that Rawls assumes as 
a premise of his model. The duty to adhere to this principle is a moral 
duty, rather than a legal duty. According to Rawls, "the ideal of 
citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty-the duty of civility-to 
be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how 
the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported 
by the political values of public reason."33 
In more recent work, Rawls has retreated from this exclusivist version 
of political liberalism to one that is more inclusive.34 According to 
this way they fulfill what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and 
to other citizens. Hence, whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act 
from and follow public reason is continually shown in their speech and 
conduct on a daily basis. 
Rawls, supra note 16, at 768-69. 
32. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 217. 
33. Id. See also Rawls, supra note 16, at 769 ("[C]itizens fulfill their duty of 
civility and support the idea of public reason by doing what they can to hold government 
officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral 
duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible 
with freedom of speech."). 
34. See Rawls, supra note 16, at 776 (noting that the•''requirement still allows us 
to introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious 
or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support 
the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support"); id. at 783-84 
("[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced 
in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political 
reasons-and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines-are presented that 
are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to 
support. This injunction to present proper political reasons I refer to as the proviso, and 
it specifies public political culture as distinct from the background culture.") (footnote 
omitted). According to Lawrence Solum, Rawls's version of liberalism may be 
interpreted as an inclusivist position. See Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 
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Rawls, citizens may justify policy positions based on comprehensive 
beliefs as long as they also give public reasons for such choices. 
Although citizens may express their comprehensive beliefs in public 
debate, they still are required to offer public reasons, even if these 
reasons do not form the true basis for their adoption of a particular 
position. 
Thus, as a general rule, Rawls would exclude religious beliefs or other 
comprehensive doctrines as the sole grounds for public justification or 
choice. Because not all citizens could reasonably endorse such beliefs, 
utilizing such beliefs as grounds for public justification or choice would 
violate his liberal principle of legitimacy. Rawls would sanction the use 
of religious and other comprehensive beliefs if the individual employing 
religious or other comprehensive beliefs as grounds for public justifica-
tion or choice could also give public reasons to justify his position to all 
members of society. Rawls's model of political liberalism, like models 
developed by other liberal theorists, rests upon a variety of underlying 
assumptions. , 
III. THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERAL MODELS 
There are several assumptions of the various models of liberalism, 
which are designed, in effect, to preclude justification of political 
positions based on religious and other comprehensive grounds. Liberal 
theories are often based upon a set of assumptions that, according to 
liberal theorists, individuals in society should "reasonably" accept; yet, 
reasonableness is defined in terms of these very same assumptions. It 
is as if the authors of such theories mean to say that these assumptions 
are what we mean by the term "liberalism" as it is used in ordinary 
discourse. A second possibility is not that these theorists are attempting 
to define "liberalism," but rather that they are attempting to discern 
which political values are most fundamental in modem liberal democrat-
ic societies such as the United States.35 Thus, they would be attempt-
ing to construct a model to govern public discourse in modem liberal 
democracies. Rawls, at times, seems to be arguing that this is the type 
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1459, 1565 (1996) ("Rawls opts for an inclusive-as opposed to 
an exclusive-interpretation of the ideal of public reason. Citizens and public officials 
do not breach the duty of civility when they offer nonpublic reasons as the foundations 
for, or supplements to, public ones. Although Rawls has been read as advocating a view 
of public reason that would exclude religious reasons from public debate, that is not the 
best reading of his work as a whole."). 
35. Professor Gardbaum describes this conception of justification as justifying 
political principles "when they constitute the best interpretation of the values embedded 
in the social practices of a society." Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and 
Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385, 411 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
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of project in which he is engaging in Political Liberalism. For example, 
with respect to the "fact of reasonable pluralism," Rawls states that "[a] 
modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a 
pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines."36 
Elsewhere, Rawls states: "We start, then, by looking to the public culture 
itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and 
principles. We hhope to formulate these ideas and principles clearly 
enough to be combined into a political conception of justice congenial 
to our most firmly held convictions.'m Thus, Rawls seems to be 
looking to modern liberal democracies as sources for the political values 
upon which his theory is based. 
If Rawls is merely looking to the political values that are already 
deemed fundamental in a given society, one might well ask how positive 
change could ever take place in society under Rawls's theory. Similarly, 
one might question what kind of justification Rawls would provide for 
basing our practices with respect to public discourse upon his liberal 
principle of legitimacy. Is it that Rawls's theory seems to "fit" a society 
such as ours better than any competing theories? These possible 
interpretations of the liberal project raise questions concerning the 
audience38 to which these theories are aimed and whether such theories 
. 
36. RAWLS, supra note 13, at xvi. See also Rawls, supra note 16, at 765-66 ("[A] 
basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism-the fact that a plurality 
of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, aud moral, 
is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.") (footnotes omitted). 
37. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 8. 
38. According to Greenawalt, Rawls is attempting to set out principles for liberal 
democracies. See Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 671. See also RAWLS, supra note 13, 
at 235. It is unclear whether Rawls is also attempting to justify liberal democracy as 
opposed to other models of society. However, Frank Michelman analyzes Rawls's 
project as follows: 
Does the book [Political Liberalism] really mean no more than to commend 
political liberalism and justice as fairness to those for whom, by reason of 
cultural situation, the Rawlsiau conception of the person is regulative already? 
Taking the book to mean no more thau that, the conception of the person is 
comfortably internal to the project. But there are also those who would take 
political liberalism, the project, to be a more globally commendable guide to 
the conduct of politics. As for them, it seems that by adopting Rawls's 
justificatory arguments they would also buy into some strong, distinctive ideas 
about what gives value to lives, humanly speaking. It seems that in order for 
Political Liberalism to be a globally relevant guide to what is right institution-
ally, the conception of the person must be correspondingly viewed as a case 
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and their political principles of self-restraint are independent of any 
comprehensive doctrine. 39 Are these theories directed at individuals 
who already accept these presuppositions, or are they an attempt to 
convince those who do not already accept these premises? This has 
been described as the paradox that liberal theories face.40 
In exploring the role of such presuppositions in liberal theories, further 
examination of the liberal theory expounded by Rawls in his book 
of what Martha Nussbaum calls "internal essentialism"-that is, a product of 
evaluative inquiry (with or without reference to "metaphysical foundations") 
into "what we really think about ourselves [qua human] and what holds our 
histor[ies as human] together." 
It is a fair question whether the book can respectfully be read to lay claim 
to anything less. For surely (the question would posit) the political conception 
of justice as fairness must be meant to have prescriptive and critical bite 
somewhere on Earth. Indeed, it must. But couldn't this "somewhere" be right 
here, in constitutional-democratic cultures whence the Rawlsian conception of 
the person is drawn? A leading aim of Political Liberalism is to persuade an 
audience, already knowing themselves as broadly committed to liberal 
constitutionalism ("constitutional democracy") that justice as fairness correctly 
interprets their broad commitment. 
Frank I. Michelman, The Subject of Liberalism, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1831 (1994) 
(footnotes omitted). See also Gardbaum, supra note 35, at 412. In addition, Professor 
Perry has explained: 
Merely invoking "the liberal principle of legitimacy" as if it were an axiom of 
American political morality does not advance the discussion; it does not close 
the gap. Invoking the principle without defending it will work only for those 
who already accept the principle. Invoking the principle without defending it 
does not tell anyone who does not already accept the principle why she should 
accept it; it does not give anyone reasons, public or otherwise, for accepting 
it. 
PERRY, supra note 1, at 59. 
39. Kent Greenawalt has noted that it is a "vexing problem ... whether any 
political principle of self-restraint can stand independently of comprehensive positions 
themselves." Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 662. 
40. Thomas Nagel has formulated the paradox as follows: 
Liberalism asks that citizens accept a certain restraint in calling on the power 
of the state to enforce some of their most deeply held convictions against 
others who do not accept them, and holds that the legitimate exercise of 
political power must be justified on more restricted grounds-grounds which 
belong in some sense to a common or public domain. 
NAGEL, supra note 3, at 158. Rawls himself notes that some will reject the idea of 
public reason: 
Since the idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic political 
values and specifies how the political relation is to be understood, those who 
believe that fundamental political questions should be decided by what they 
regard as the best reasons according to their own idea of the whole 
truth-including their religious or secular comprehensive doctrine-and not by 
reasons that might be shared by all citizens as free and equal, will of course 
reject the idea of public reason. Political liberalism views this insistence on 
the whole truth in politics as incompatible with democratic citizenship and the 
idea of legitimate law. 
Rawls, supra note 16, at 771. 
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Political Liberalism is useful. As noted in the foregoing discussion, 
Rawls posits three requirements for a fair and stable system. of coopera-
tion.41 The first is that the basic structure of society be regulated by a 
political conception of justice. The second is that this political 
conception of justice is the focus of an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Finally, the third requirement is 
that public discussion is conducted in terms of the political conception 
of justice when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are 
at stake. 
In addition to these requirements for a fair and stable system. of 
cooperation, Rawls's theory presupposes certain political values. Rawls 
claims that his theory is dependent upon the priority of right over the 
good and states: 
[T]he priority of right means (in its general meaning) that the ideas of the good 
used must be political ideas ... so that we need not rely on comprehensive 
conceptions of the good but only on ideas tailored to fit within the political 
conception. Second, the priority of right means (in its particular meaning) that 
the principles of justice set limits to permissible ways of life . . . : the claims 
that citizens make to pursue ends transgressing those limits have no weight. 
The priority of right gives the principles of justice a strict precedence in 
citizens' deliberations and limits their freedom to advance certain ways of life. 
It characterizes the structure and content of justice as fairness and what it 
regards as good reasons in deliberation. 42 
Thus, Rawls's theory presupposes certain "principles of justice" that 
constrain citizens in exercising their powers of political choice and 
justification. Among the presuppositions of Rawls's model (which are 
comm.on among liberal theories in general) are that: (1) citizens must be 
viewed as being "free and equal" -therefore, political coercion cannot 
be exercised absent justification based upon public reasons; (2) citizens 
count social unity among the political values; (3) what Rawls terms "the 
fact of reasonable pluralism." exists; (4) some conception of neutrality 
among competing comprehensive doctrines is a political value; (5) the 
state is a closed system.; (6) political power is always coercive; and (7) 
political values override all other values. None of these assumptions, 
however, need necessarily be a part of a model of public discourse that 
m.ay accurately be characterized as "liberal." 
41. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
42. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 209. 
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A. Political Coercion and the Status of Citizens as 
"Free and Equal" 
One argument advanced against utilizing religious beliefs as a basis for 
public justification or choice is that to make a coercive political choice 
on the basis of a belief that not all subject to the choice reasonably 
accept violates the principle that all members of society should be 
viewed as being "free and equal." For example, according to Robert 
Audi, "[i]f you are fully rational and I cannot convince you of my view 
by arguments framed in the concepts we share as rational beings, then 
even if mine is the majority view I should not coerce you."43 This 
argument that beliefs based on premises that are not shared by all 
members of society should not be used in justifying coercive political 
choice is also reflected in Kent Greenawalt's work. Greenawalt argues 
that religious beliefs, comprehensive philosophic views, and other views, 
which he describes as not being "generally accessible," should not be 
used in public discussion or decisionmak:ing.44 Greenawalt believes 
that the inaccessibility of religious convictions is a result of their being 
based on experiences that are "not fully accessible to others."45 He 
distinguishes such inaccessible grounds for belief from certain types of 
accessible grounds including "philosophic arguments for God," 
"particular evidence in the stream of human history," and what 
Greenawalt terms the "fruits of conviction."46 
Ronald Dworkin and Charles Larmore have also argued that viewing 
citizens as being free and equal necessitates some principle of state 
neutrality with respect to aall comprehensive doctrines of citizens. 
According to Larmore, "[a] commitment to treating others with equal 
respect forms the ultimate reason why in the face of disagreement we 
should keep the conversation going, and to do that, of course, we must 
retreat to neutral ground."47 Dworkin makes a similar argument: "Since 
the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions [of the good], the 
government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to 
another .... "48 
Is it really necessary, however, that individuals in a liberal society, 
much less any society in general, be viewed as being "free and equal"? 
43. Audi, supra note 1, at 701. 
44. Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 648. 
45. Id. at 649 (footnote omitted). 
46. Id. at 650-51. 
47. LARMORE, supra note 4, at 67. 
48. Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 64 (Michael J. 
Sandel ed., 1984). 
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Such an assumption arguably is targeted at individuals who already 
assent to some form of liberalism. 49 Furthermore, must coercive 
political power necessarily be exercised only if it can be justified based 
upon grounds to which all citizens should reasonably assent? The 
requirement is reasonable agreement, not actual agreement. Since 
reasonableness is defined by Rawls in terms of political values to which 
Rawls asserts all citizens should reasonably assent, Rawls's theory is 
open to the charge of circularity. Thus, the nature of Rawls's project 
must be questioned. Is the purpose to convince liberals that his version 
of liberalism is the most attractive? If so, viewing citizens as being free 
and equal is not clearly a necessary component of the most "reasonable" 
liberal model, unless one defines "reasonableness" as viewing citizens 
as being free and equal. If Rawls wishes to accomplish more than 
merely convincing liberals that his version of liberalism is the most 
attractive, then it is difficult to understand why nonliberals would accept 
the proposition that citizens must be viewed as being "free and equal" 
members of society. 
B. The Virtue of Social Unity 
The fact that individuals value stability and that individuals in society 
wish to maintain the stability of their society is a presupposition of 
Rawls's model.50 Rawls's theory is an attempt to minimize conflicts 
49. See Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 351-52 
(1990) (noting that the argument for liberalism applies only to those who already accept 
the "norms of rational dialogue and equal respect"). 
50. Rawls argues that the goal of social stability requires that coercive political 
power not be applied unless it may be justified by an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines: 
A public and workable agreement on a single general and comprehensive 
conception [of the good] could be maintained only by the oppressive use of 
state power. Since we are concerned with securing the stability of a 
constitutional regime, and wish to achieve free and willing agreement on a 
political conception of justice that establishes at least the constitutional 
essentials, we must find another basis of agreement than that of a general and 
comprehensive doctrine. 
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 
(1987) (footnotes omitted). Rawls has further stated: 
[W]ithout citizens' allegiance to public reason and their honoring the duty of 
civility, divisions and hostilities between doctrines are bound in time to assert 
themselves, should they not already exist. Harmony and concord among 
doctrines and a people's affirming public reason are unhappily not a permanent 
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among various comprehensive doctrines. Thus, he posits that political 
values that are the subject of an overlapping consensus should override 
all comprehensive doctrines. According to Rawls, "[t]he nature of social 
unity is given by a stable overlapping consensus of reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines."51 Kent Greenawalt has made a similar argument. 
Greenawalt has urged that a principle of restraint is necessary in order 
to minimize "dissensus and resentment, and feelings of being exclud-
ed."52 According to Greenawalt, "[i]f widely variant perspectives on 
critical subjects dominate political life, society may suffer disunity. 
Citizens may not be able to depend on the application of any core 
principles of justice and they may find none to which they need feel 
loyalty."53 
However, reliance on religious beliefs in political discourse might not 
necessarily be destabilizing. In the context of a society in which the 
majority of its members accept a common set of religious beliefs, there 
seemingly would be little danger of social instability if religious beliefs 
were utilized in political argument and choice.54 Furthermore, there is 
at least as great a chance of social instability arising from conflicts in 
areas of "noncomprehensive morality." Professor Gardbaum has 
condition of social life. Rather, harmony and concord depend on the vitality 
of the public political culture and on citizens' being devoted to and realizing 
the ideal of public reason. Citizens could easily fall into bitterness and 
resentment, once they no longer see the point of affirming an ideal of public 
reason and come to ignore it. 
Rawls, supra note 16, at 803. Frank Michelman, however, has cautioned against reading 
Rawls as arguing that stability is the fundamental political value upon which liberalism 
rests: 
If one reads this formulation [of Rawls's] to make political stability (on liberal 
terms) the ultimate quest for liberal constitutionalism, it may be misleading. 
Stability is indeed one of Rawls' main concerns, but he conceives that stability 
may flow from either of two types of agreement. One is a true, heartfelt, and 
conscious moral consensus on the regnant political conception. The other is 
a strategic compromise or balance of forces ("modus vivendi") among 
participants conscious of moral divisions that preclude affirmation by all of the 
morality of one and the same constitutional conception. 
Michelman, supra note 38, at 1816. 
51. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 43. 
52. Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 675. 
53. Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 670. 
54. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals 
After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1991). According to Professor Gardbaum: 
Within liberal societies, the amount of coercion generally involved in 
promoting such "domestic" moral ideals as autonomy, equality, and human 
dignity is not always great, and often much less than · that involved in 
importing "foreign" ideals into a previously homogeneous moral culture. The 
model of the Bolshevik Party implanting and fostering the value of commu-
nism on Czarist Russia should not tyrannize our minds on this issue. 
Id. at 1369. 
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observed that the danger of instability arising from state promotion of 
policies exists in areas such as war and foreign policy, substantive 
equality of opportunity, direct taxation, and the distribution of income 
and wealth. 55 Finally, those individuals who must restrain themselves 
from making public arguments or choices based upon religious or other 
comprehensive grounds, comprising beliefs that they deem the most 
fundamental and important, may feel resentment at not being free to 
appeal to their own fundamental beliefs.56 Such resentment may in turn 
increase the likelihood of social instability. 
Rawls, furthermore, admits that attaining social stability does not 
require that every member of society accept the constitutional essentials 
upon which a society is based, but only that a "substantial majority" 
support the current regime. According to Rawls, "an enduring and 
secure democratic regime, one not divided into contending doctrinal 
confessions and hostile social classes, must be willingly and freely 
supported by at least a substantial majority of its politically active 
citizens."57 The possibility, therefore, remains that stability could exist 
without rigorously adhering to the liberal principle of legitimacy. 
Finally, the presupposition that stability is a preeminent political value 
may be challenged. As Charles Larmore has noted, the argument for 
liberalism "applies only to people who are indeed interested in devising 
55. See id. at 1369-70. Professor Perry has explained: 
American history does not suggest that religious debates about controversial 
issues-racial discrimination, for example, or war-are invariably more 
divisive than secular debates about those or other issues. Some issues are so 
controversial that debate about them is inevitably divisive without regard to 
whether the debate is partly religious or, instead, only secular. 
PERRY, supra note 1, at 743 (footnotes omitted). He has further argued: 
[l]t is implausible to believe that in the context of a liberal democratic society 
like the United States, governmental reliance on religiously based moral 
arguments in making political choices ( even coercive ones) is invariably 
destabilizing-or that it is invariably more destabilizing than governmental 
reliance on controversial secular moral arguments. 
Id. at 755. See also H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 
1709 (1988) ("If religion is so disruptive that it must be excluded from discussion, why 
can not the same be said of property rights (and indeed at least part of the founders' 
concern over property was a concern over the social unrest that wealth redistribution 
might inspire).") (footnote omitted). 
56. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 671, 672 (1992) (noting that "many religious people clearly feel excluded and 
alienated from public life" in the United States) (footnote omitted). 
57. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 38. 
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principles of political association."58 However, less stringently put, the 
argument for liberalism also applies only to those who privilege social 
stability above all comprehensive values. Rawls's presupposition of the 
value of stability as well as his presupposition that citizens must be 
viewed as free and equal members of a democratic society are evidenced 
in his formulation of the "problem of political liberalism." Rawls asks: 
"How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable 
though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines ?"59 
However, even assuming that one values a society conceived of as 
composed of free and equal citizens, whether one will value a stable 
society is unclear. In the long run, fragmenting into two or more 
distinct societies to achieve an environment wherein citizens are viewed 
as being free and equal within each newly-created society might be in 
the interests of a given society. Conversely, if one values stability over 
all else, whether one would value a society wherein all citizens were 
viewed as being free and equal is unclear. Historically, there have been 
many societies that were stable, but in which citizens were not viewed 
as being free and equal members of society. For Rawls, it would seem 
that the value of viewing citizens as being free and equal trumps the 
value of stability, but one could prioritize these values differently. 
Whether social instability will result if one does not view citizens as 
being free and equal is equally unclear. Finally, one might reject both 
the value of stability and the value of viewing citizens as being free and 
equal. Where does this leave Rawls? Because he has defined "reason-
ableness" in terms of accepting these values,60 all that he can do is 
pejoratively term you "unreasonable." 
58. Larmore, supra note 49, at 352. 
59. RAWLS, supra note 13, at xviii. 
60. See Paul F. Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1814, 1816 
(1994) ("Rawls' s analysis of political issues amounts to little more than the shamanistic 
incantation of the word 'reasonable."'). Rawls has asserted: 
It is, of course, up to citizens themselves to affirm, revise, or change their 
comprehensive doctrines. Their doctrines may override or count for naught the 
political values of a constitutional democratic society. But then the citizens 
cannot claim that such doctrines are reasonable. Since the criterion of 
reciprocity is an essential ingredient specifying public reason and its content, 
political liberalism rejects as unreasonable all such doctrines. 
Rawls, supra note 16, at 801. 
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C. The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism 
Another assumption of Rawls's model is "the fact of reasonable 
pluralism."61 According to Rawls, "the diversity of reasonable compre-
hensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern 
democratic societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon 
pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democra-
cy."62 The fact of reasonable pluralism is the catalyst for social 
instability. Rawls argues that the fact of reasonable pluralism necessi-
tates that one adopt the liberal principle of legitimacy because if one 
rejects this model, political instability will result.' 
Once we accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent condition of 
public culture under free institutions, the idea of the reasonable is more suitable 
as part of the basis of public justification for a constitutional regime than the 
idea of moral truth. Holding a political conception as true, and for that reason 
alone the one suitable basis of public reason, is exclusive, even sectarian, and 
so likely to foster political division. 63 
Assuming for a moment that Rawls's assertion is correct concerning the 
fact of reasonable pluralism in a democratic society, notice that the claim 
is made only with respect to democratic societies. One might argue, 
therefore, as has Professor Gardbaum, 64 that the fact of reasonable 
61. According to Professor Gardbaum, there are two senses in which the fact of 
reasonable pluralism may be understood. The first understanding involves the "truth of 
pluralism: It is a moral fact that a variety of valid and incompatible moral ends and 
values, which do not ultimately form a coherent whole." Gardbaum, supra note 35, at 
390. The second understanding of the fact of reasonable pluralism is as "an empirical 
or sociological claim about the comprehensive doctrines actually held by the citizens of 
a particular society or particular type of society, rather than a claim about the truth or 
validity of those doctrines." Id. 
62. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 36 (emphasis added). Rawls states that "[t]he 
political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a diversity of opposing and 
irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines." Id. at 3-4. 
63. Id. at 129. 
64. According to Professor Gardbaum:. 
By viewing liberalism as the result of, and only reasonable solution to, the 
problem of preexisting moral dissensus, political liberals assume that such 
dissensus is similarly an independent (or exogenous) variable, unaffected by 
the political context in which it arises. This assumption, which constitutes a 
second sense in which political liberalism takes the fact of reasonable 
pluralism as a "given," is sociologically and theoretically naive. It ignores the 
social and political conditions that give rise to a situation in which citizens 
affirm radically diverse ( or, conversely, more uniform) conceptions of the good 
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pluralism is essentially an effect of liberal theories rather than a 
justification for liberal theories. As Rawls acknowledges, "a continuing 
shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 
moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state 
power."65 Leaving aside Rawls's claim that coercion is the only way 
in which a continued shared understanding concerning one comprehen-
sive doctrine can be maintained in a society, Rawls is admitting, in 
essence, that there are societies in which there might be no "fact of 
reasonable pluralism." Why then, should these societies adopt the liberal 
principle of legitimacy and follow Rawls's liberal political model? 
Perhaps Rawls would respond that his model is designed for modern 
liberal democratic societies such as the United States, which already 
privilege the political values upon which his theory is based. However, 
one might then ask why liberal democratic societies should privilege 
these values, illustrating that Rawls's theory becomes merely descriptive 
rather than prescriptive, as any moral theory must be. 
Finally, even if one accepts this fact of reasonable pluralism with 
respect to certain fundamental moral beliefs, why does this fact of 
reasonable pluralism not also exist with respect to fundamental beliefs 
concerning principles of justice? Rawls assumes that, as part of the 
overlapping consensus, citizens will assent to the principle that 
individuals should be viewed as free and equal citizens. Therefore, they 
will not wish to exercise political coercion absent the reasonable consent 
of members of society. As Michael Sandel has noted: 
[F]or political liberalism., the case for the priority of the right over the good 
depends on the claim. that modem democratic societies are characterized by a 
"fact of reasonable pluralism." about the good. . . . Though it is certainly true 
that people in modem democratic societies hold a variety of conflicting moral 
and religious views, it cannot be said that there is a "fact of reasonable 
in the first place. Such a situation is by no means so comm.on (historically or 
geographically) that the impact of social, political, and cultural context can be 
ignored without cost. By thus taking as given much that is crucial to our 
understanding of political society and therefore in need of explanation and 
justification, political liberalism. presents as a premise of the argument 
something that looks rather more like a conclusion. 
Political liberalism. in effect provides one account of the relationship 
between liberalism. and moral conflict, an account that I suggest is gravely 
imbalanced and incomplete. Rather than being simply the extraneous cause 
of liberalism., as political liberalism. sees it, moral pluralism. is at least as much 
the result and characteristic achievement of liberal social and political culture 
and institutions. In a significant sense, the fact of reasonable pluralism. is the 
natural and intended consequence of liberalism.. 
Gardbaurn, supra note 35, at 405-06 (footnote omitted). 
65. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 37. 
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pluralism" about morality and religion that does not also apply to questions of 
justice.66 
In essence, this analysis is an attempt to illustrate that there may well be 
a "fact of reasonable pluralism" with respect to fundamental beliefs 
concerning principles of justice. No:ne of the assumptions of the 
proffered liberal theories seem to be particularly inherent in "liberalism" 
as commonly understood. Only if one defines "liberalism" as equivalent 
to a certain set of political values may such a result be achieved. 
D. Neutrality 
A common feature of liberal theories is that they presuppose the value 
of neutrality among competing conceptions of the good. 67 For exam-
ple, Bruce Ackerman,68 Ronald Dworkin,69 Charles Larmore,70 and 
Thomas Nagel71 have all proposed liberal theories that involve some 
concept of neutrality. The concept of neutrality has been attacked at a 
normative level by a variety of commentators, including feminists,72 
66. Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1994). 
67. This is essentially the approach that the Supreme Court has taken to 
interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. See David M. Smolin, 
Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response to 
Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1071-72 (1991) (noting that the Court has 
interpreted the clauses as ensuring "governmental neutrality toward religion") (footnote 
omitted). 
68. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980) 
("No reason [for exercising coercive political power] is a good reason if it requires the 
power holder to assert . . . that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by 
any of his fellow citizens."). 
69. See Dworkin, supra note 5, at 113-43. See also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER 
OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) ("[P]olitical decisions must be, so far as is possible, 
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to 
life."). 
70. See Larmore, supra note 49, at 339. 
71. See Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 215 (1987). See also NAGEL, supra note 3, at 159 (arguing that the principle of 
neutrality may be viewed as an implication of Kant's categorical imperative to treat 
individuals as an end rather than a means: "On one reading of this principle [of 
neutrality], it implies that if you force someone to serve an end that he cannot be given 
adequate reason to share, you are treating him as a mere means-even if the end is his 
own good, as you see it but he doesn't.") (footnote omitted). 
72. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES 
ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). 
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critical legal studies scholars,73 republicans,74 and those who hold 
traditional religious beliefs.75 The concept of neutrality has also been 
criticized as being "impossibly restrictive."76 As Stephen Carter has 
noted, "the ideal of neutrality ... cannot be justified in its own terms. 
It must, in effect, be assumed. In that sense, it rests oon untestable 
faith-or, put otherwise, on a privileged insight."77 Similarly, Steven 
Smith has articulated the following criticism of a criterion of neutrality: 
[T]he common denominator argument is fraudulent. Suppose Dad and 
Daughter are discussing what to have for dinner. Daughter proposes: "Let's just 
have dessert." Dad suggests that it would be better to have a full meal, with 
salad, meat, fruit, cooked vegetables, and then dessert. Daughter responds: 
"Obviously, Dad, we disagree about a lot of things. But there is one thing we 
agree on; we both want dessert. Clearly the fair and democratic solution is to 
accept what we agree on. So let's just have dessert." Although he might 
admire Daughter's cleverness, Dad is not likely to be taken in by this common 
denominator ploy. The argument that secular public discourse provides a 
common denominator that all citizens share is.comparably clever-and equally 
unpersuasive. 78 
Furthermore, other commentators have observed that the fact that certain 
grounds of belief are not "publicly accessible" or are "incommensurable" 
with other individuals' beliefs is not enough to necessitate a criterion of 
73. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 
(1986). 
14. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme.Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and 
Narrative, 91 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 91 YALE L.J. 
1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Forward: Traces of 
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 91 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival]; Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). 
75. See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 67. 
76. Perry, Further Thoughts, supra note 18, at 712. See also PERRY, supra note 
7, at 9-27 (attacking the idea of neutral politics as being unrealistic because politics and 
law must appeal at some point to moral premises that are not universally shared); Perry, 
Further Thoughts, supra note 18, at 709 (stating that "[t]he neutralist ideal of political 
choice, despite occasional pretensions to the contrary, is not itself neutral or impartial 
.... "); PERRY, supra note 7, at 28 (concluding that "the quest for the holy Grail of neu-
tral/impartial political justification is spent and that it is past time to take a different, 
more promising path"). For a similar criticism, see Sandel, supra note 66, at 1776 
("[A]ccording to the ideal of public reason advanced by political liberalism, citizens may 
not legitimately discuss fundamental political and constitutional questions with reference 
to their moral and religious ideals. But this is an unduly severe restriction that would 
impoverish political discourse and rule out important dimensions of public delibera-
tion."). 
77. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
932, 941-42 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
78. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the 
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1010 (1989). 
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neutrality in public justification and choice. As Professor Gardbaum has 
noted: 
Incommensurability does not generally appear to require political neutrality. 
. . . [C]onflicts between competing values often arise that have no one rational 
outcome, and yet the state is not required to remain neutral among them. For 
example, the following pairs all represent political and economic values or goals 
about whose priority reasonable people can disagree: economic growth and 
conservation of natural resources, specialization and self-sufficiency, current and 
future consumption, expenditure on space exploration and welfare programs. 
Yet incommensurability does not compel state neutrality in these instances. To 
the contrary, the competition between these values and goals constitutes the 
very substance of politics. 79 
Rawls distances himself from the claim that his version of political 
liberalism is neutral with respect to the various comprehensive doctrines 
found in society. He distinguishes between three varieties of neutrality: 
neutrality of aim, neutrality of effect or influence, and procedural 
neutrality: 
[W]e may distinguish procedural neutrality from neutrality of aim; but the latter 
is not to be confused with neutrality of effect or influence. As a political 
conception for the basic structure justice as fairness as a whole tries to provide 
common ground as the focus of an overlapping consensus. It also hopes to 
satisfy neutrality of aim in the sense that basic institutions and public policy are 
not to be designed to favor any particular comprehensive doctrine. Neutrality 
of effect or influence political liberalism abandons as impracticable, and since 
this idea is strongly suggested by the term itself, this is a reason for avoiding 
it. 80 
According to Rawls, his version of political liberalism is not neutral in 
the sense that it does not result in encouraging certain ways of life while 
discouraging others. The framework of society is such that no particular 
comprehensive doctrine is privileged. According to Rawls, this 
difference distinguishes his version of political liberalism from what he 
terms "comprehensive liberalism."81 However, Rawls's own theory is 
79. Gardbaum, supra note 54, at 1361. 
80. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 193-94 (footnotes omitted). 
81. Id. at 196. Professor Gardbaum has also noted that the distinction to be drawn 
between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism lies in the "content and scope" 
of the neutrality under each form of liberalism: 
[F]ar more important than this issue of the (neutral versus partisan) justifica-
tion of neutrality is the content and scope of neutrality required by each of the 
two conceptions of liberalism. Whereas political liberalism requires state 
impartiality with respect both to first-order ways of life and to the 
second-order issue of how we come to affirm them, the account of liberalism 
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open to the charge that it represents just another comprehensive 
doctrine-that his political values merely constitute some overarching 
view of political good-or that his theory at least privileges certain 
comprehensive doctrines that significantly overlap with his set of 
political values.82 The problem is that Rawls does not flesh out the 
difference between his political values and the comprehensive moral, 
religious, and philosophical values that he would exclude from public 
justification and choice. How can Rawls claim that the set of political 
values does not form just another comprehensive doctrine, or at least 
privilege certain comprehensive doctrines? Because it tends to privilege 
certain comprehensive doctrines, Rawls's theory may be vulnerable to 
the attacks on neutrality to which comprehensive liberalism is subject. 
E. The Model of the State: A Closed System 
Another assumption of Rawls's model that is related to his assumption 
that individuals value social unity is that the relationship of persons 
within the basic structure of society is "a structure of basic institutions 
we enter only by birth and exit only by death .... "83 This assumption 
is significant because, were it not a feature of Rawls's model, the 
problem of political coercion based upon nonpublic reasons and any 
potential resulting social instability would be less urgent. Individuals 
could leave a particular society rather than contribute to increased social 
instability and thereby lessen the salience of the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. However, by assuming that society is a closed system, Rawls 
effectively shuts off this potential safety valve. Furthermore, it would 
seem that viewing the state as a closed system does not accord the 
members of society the full measure of autonomy necessary in viewing 
them as being "free and equal." Certainly one aspect of freedom is to 
be able to leave one society in favor of another society that one finds 
more congenial. 
presented here (a) specifically privileges choice at the second-order level and 
(b) requires only that measure of first-order neutrality necessary to promote 
choice. 
Gardbaum, supra note 35, at 396. 
82. See Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997, 1000 
( observing that liberalism is analogous to any other comprehensive doctrine, such as 
religious doctrines). Fish terms liberalism a "moral agenda," stating: 
Id. 
[Liberalism] is a very particular moral agenda (privileging the individual over 
the community, the cognitive over the affective, the abstract over the 
particular) that has managed, by the very partisan means it claims to transcend, 
to grab the moral high ground, and to grab it from a discourse-the discourse 
of religion-that had held it for centuries. 
83. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 135-36. 
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F. The Coercive Nature of Political Power 
Another assumption of Rawls's model is that "political power is 
always coercive power backed by the government's use of sanctions."84 
As Professors Gardbaum85 and Perry86 have observed, not every 
contested political choice is coercive. Society might recommend or 
advocate certain positions without resorting to exercise of its coercive 
power. Thus, in cases where coercive power is not being exercised, 
citizens would be able to utilize nonpublic reasons as grounds for public 
choice or justification without violating Rawls's liberal principle of 
legitimacy. Rawls gives us no criterion for differentiating between 
coercive and noncoercive exercise of political power, but rather assumes 
84. Id. at 136. 
85. See Gardbaum, supra note 54, at 1366-67 (providing examples of tax breaks 
for religion, financial aid for parochial schools, and placing a creche in a courthouse as 
illustrations of the state promoting certain comprehensive beliefs without resorting to 
coercion); Gardbaum, supra note 35, at 398 ("[W]hile the state's monopoly of the 
legitimate use of violence iis its destructive attribute, it also possesses a number of 
noncoercive means to promote favored ways of life, such as simple exhortation and the 
use of financial and other incentives.") (footnotes omitted). However, it certainly could 
be argued that any governmental action is inherently coercive. If the taxes collected by 
the government were not backed by the use of force in cases of nonpayment, no 
governmental action would be possible. Furthermore, although Gardbaum argues that 
there are noncoercive governmental activities, he recognizes that these activities may still 
serve to inhibit the autonomy of some members of society. As an illustration, Gardbaum 
refers to the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, under which certain 
noncoercive governmental action is still held to be violative of the nonestablishment 
directive under the Clause: 
Given, then, that the state clearly possesses noncoercive means of promoting 
substantive ends, would its use of these means to encourage valuable ways of 
life still be inconsistent with the general pursuit of autonomy? The Establish-
ment Clause examples, I think, suggest an answer. The dichotomy of 
"coercion or choice" is not an exhaustive one: Authority, tradition, and 
custom are alternative bases for acting which, without being coercive, may 
nonetheless replace meaningful choice. With respect specifically to authority, 
the state is special because it cannot purport to act nonauthoritatively. A way 
of life that the state endorses and promotes, even through symbolic or 
persuasive means, is an "authorized" way of life. The concern is that 
individuals may defer to the state's authority, just as we normally wish them 
to do in the case of general obedience to the law. Yet, adopting a valuable 
way of life out of deference to authority is counterproductive from the 
perspective of autonomy. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
86. See Perry, Further Thoughts, supra note 18, at 710. 
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that the exercise of political power is always coercive. Therefore, the 
features of liberal models that are argued to necessitate exclusion of 
religious and other comprehensive doctrines as grounds for political 
choice and justification are features that are not necessarily essential to 
liberalism as such. 
G. The Supremacy of Political Values 
Rawls's theory, as presented in Political Liberalism, posits that 
individuals should base arguments concerning constitutional essentials 
as well as their choice in matters concerning· constitutional essentials 
upon public reasons rather than upon their own comprehensive doctrines. 
One might well ask, however, why individuals should forego appealing 
to those beliefs they might hold most strongly in favor of argument and 
choice based on public reasons.87 Rawls should have stated that 
political liberalism presupposes his "ideal of democratic citizenship" 
rather than proposes it. If one does not adhere to such a conception of 
the citizen's role in society, one will not assent to Rawls's version of 
political liberalism. Michael Sandel has forcefully made this point: 
[N]otwithstanding the importance of the "political values" to which Rawls 
appeals, it is not always reasonable to bracket, or set aside for political 
purposes, claims arising from within comprehensive · moral and religious 
doctrines. Where grave moral questions are concerned, whether it is reasonable 
to bracket moral and religious controversies for the sake of political agreement 
partly depends on which of the contending moral or religious doctrines is 
true.88 
In certain instances, beliefs that comprise one's comprehensive doctrine 
could conceivably override those public reasons concerning constitutional 
essentials. The typicalexamples of such instances, in which there is a 
strong case for appealing to one's own comprehensive doctrine rather 
than public reason, are the contemporary issue of abortion and the 
87. See Joshua Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1503, 
1529 (1994) (noting that, because individuals rarely regard political values as ultimate 
values, there is always the possibility of a breakdown in Rawls's system). 
88. Sandel, supra note 66, at 1776. Sandel elaborates on this point: 
Even granting the importance of securing social cooperation on the basis of 
mutual respect, what is to guarantee that this interest is always so important 
as to outweigh any competing interest that could arise from within a 
comprehensive moral or religious ·view? ... If political liberalism therefore 
allows that some such doctrines might be true, then what is to assure that none 
can generate values sufficiently compelling to burst the brackets, so to speak, 
and morally outweigh the political values of toleration, fairness, and social 
cooperation based on mutual respect? 
Id. at 1777. 
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historical issues of slavery89 and civil rights.90 Such examples provide 
powerful arguments for appealing to comprehensive doctrines as opposed 
to public reasons. 
Furthermore, resort to comprehensive doctrines may be necessary in 
some instances in order to resolve certain issues. As Michael Perry has 
argued, "Only a politics in which· beliefs about human good, including 
disputed beliefs, have a central place is capable of addressing our most 
basic political questions."91 A good example of this phenomenon is 
found in the controversy over abortion. John. Rawls discusses this 
controversy in his book, Political Liberalism. Rawls's discussion of this 
issue, which he relegates to a footnote, is worth quoting at length 
because it provides insights into the way in which Rawls's theory might 
work in practice. 
[C]onsider the troubled question of abortion. Suppose first that the society in 
question is well-ordered and that we are dealing with the normal case of mature 
adult women. It is best to be clear about this idealized case first; for once we 
are clear about it, we have a guide that helps us to think about other cases, 
which force us to consider exceptional circumstances. Suppose further that we 
consider the question in terms of these three important political values: the due 
respect for human life, the ordered reproduction of political society over time, 
89. See Solum, supra note 6, at 751 (arguing that it may be necessary at times to 
utilize nonpublic reasons "to prevent a great evil"). 
90. See Rawls, supra note 13, at 251 (arguing that abolitionist and civil rights 
leaders "did not go against the ideal of public reason; or rather, they· did not provided 
they thought, or on reflection would have thought (as they certainly could have thought), 
that the comprehensive reasons they appealed to were required to give sufficient strength 
to the political conception to be subsequently realized"). See also Solum, supra note 6, 
at 751 (noting that the contemporary civil rights movement successfully utilized religious 
appeals, as illustrated by the speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.). 
91. PERRY, supra note 7, at 29. Perry argues: 
[A] practice of political justification, like Ackerman's and Nagel's practices, 
that excludes or marginalizes· disputed beliefs about human good is bereft of 
the normative resources required for addressing, in more than a superficial 
way, much less resolving, the most fundamental political-moral questions that 
engage and divide us, like questions about human rights. 
Id. at 43. Perry has noted, in particular, that nonpublic reasons must be invoked in the 
context of the abortion controversy: 
Some citizens believe that all human life, including unborn human life, is 
sacred. What would Rawls have the citizen do who sincerely believes that 
innocent lives hang in the balance? It bears emphasis here that following the 
path of public reason does not lead, without the intervention of nonpublic 
reasons, to the "pro-choice" position in the abortion controversy any more than 
it leads to the "pro-life" position. 
PERRY, supra note 1, at 60. 
1599 
including the family in some form, and finally the equality of women as equal 
citizens. (There are, of course, other important political values besides these.) 
Now I believe any reasonable balance of these three values will give a woman 
a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the 
first trimester. The reason for this is that at this early stage of pregnancy the 
political value of the equality of women is overriding, and this right is required 
to give it substance and force. Other political values, if tallied in, would not, 
I think, affect this conclusion. A reasonable balance may allow her such a right 
beyond this, at least in certain circumstances. However, I do not discuss the 
question in general here, as I simply want to illustrate the point of the text by 
saying that any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political 
values excluding that duly qualified right in the first trimester is to that extent 
unreasonable; and depending on details of its formulation, it may also be cruel 
and oppressive; for example, if it denied the right altogether except in the case 
of rape and incest. Thus, assuming that this question is either a constitutional 
essential or a matter of basic justice, we would go against the ideal of public 
reason if we voted from a comprehensive doctrine that denied this right .... 92 
Note that Rawls employs certain comprehensive beliefs in resolving the 
abortion controversy. For example, he assumes that the fetus is not 
among those who qualify as "free and equal citizens" in society. Resort 
to comprehensive doctrines is necessary in determining the status of the 
fetus-whether it qualifies as a "free and equal" citizen in Rawls's 
model. What political value can give us the answer to this question? 
The answer will not emerge from some overlapping consensus of the 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines of members of society. Further-
more, the manner in which Rawls reaches the highly specific conclusion, 
that restriction of a woman's right to an abortion during the first 
trimester would violate the ideal of public reason, is not apparent. He 
must be relying on certain other unstated premises, such as perceiving 
the value of the fetus as less before viability, which will only occur after 
the first trimester. This example illustrates, therefore, the necessity of 
appealing to comprehensive values that are not the subject of an 
overlapping consensus in resolving certain political controversies 
involving constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice. One of 
the problems with Rawls's theory is the sparsity of real world applica-
tions that he offers his readers.93 As we have seen in the context of 
abortion, this oversight is not surprising given the awkwardness of the 
application of his theory to concrete problems. Such applications might 
frequently illustrate the flaws in his theory. 
Whether all theories that might be classified as liberal need accept the 
foregoing assumptions of proffered liberal models, such as that of Rawls, 
92. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 243-44 n.32. See also PERRY, supra note 1, at 
763-64 (discussing the abortion controversy). 
93. This problem is remedied to a certain extent in Rawls's latest work. See 
Rawls, supra note 16. 
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is unclear. One could imagine, for example, a liberal theory in which 
all that is required to legitimate a particular constitutional regime is the 
actual consent (whether explicit or tacit) of the governed and not their 
reasonable consent. This is essentially the position of the classical 
liberal. Furthermore, one could imagine a society in which any 
comprehensive beliefs might be used as grounds for public justification 
or choice. Thus, there are at least two plausible liberal alternatives to 
Rawls's theory. 
IV IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERAL MODELS 
Even if one accepts the assumptions upon which liberal theories, such 
as that of Rawls, are based, it does not necessarily follow that one must 
abstain from using religious reasons in justifying one's positions in 
discourse in the public square. For example, Ronald Dworkin has noted, 
"there is broad agreement within modern politics that the government 
must treat all its citizens with equal concern and respect . . . . Different 
people hold, however, . . . very different conceptions of what that 
abstract principle requires in particular cases."94 Treating all individu-
als within society as free and equal citizens arguably necessitates that 
one respect individuals when making arguments concerning political 
positions based upon grounds that are not accessible to oneself. Not 
allowing individuals holding religious beliefs to found their discourse in 
the public arena upon these beliefs seems to violate this principle and 
create a form of "second class" citizenship.95 In particular, Michael 
Perry has noted that various liberal tests of "common critical rationality" 
or "reasonableness," which preclude the utilization of religious beliefs 
as grounds for public justification or choice, serve to privilege the beliefs 
of secular intellectuals and to place individuals with profound religious 
beliefs at a disadvantage with respect to other members of society.96 
The same might be said of individuals with profound philosophical 
beliefs or other comprehensive doctrines, whose beliefs are subject to 
94. See Dworkin, supra note 48, at 63. 
95. See Smolin, supra note 67, at 1067. See also Joshua Cohen, A. More 
Democratic Liberalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1503, 1536 (1994) (noting that as the range 
of positions over which agreement is sought is narrowed, the likelihood of agreement 
increases but that such a narrowing "requires arbitrary and exclusionary restrictions on 
the set of relevant alternatives"). 
96. PERRY, supra note 7, at 14. 
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greater exclusion as grounds for public justification and choice than 
those of secular intellectuals, whose own comprehensive views are more 
congenial to the assumptions of the liberal state. As Gerald Dworkin 
has noted: "There is a gap between a premise which requires the state 
to show equal concern and respect for all its citizens and a conclusion 
which rules out as legitimate grounds for coercion the fact that a 
majority believes that conduct is immoral, wicked, or wrong. That gap 
has yet to be closed."97 These arguments, based upon religious or other 
comprehensive doctrines, may have no persuasive force if the premises 
upon which they are based are not shared by a number of other citizens. 
However, treating all individuals as free and equal citizens dictates that 
one respect others' rights to voice their opinions without reacting by 
contributing to a decline in social stability by taking offense or resorting 
to violence. 
Furthermore, discourse in the public square based upon religious 
beliefs does not necessarily lead to social instability.98 As Professor 
Perry has noted, "religious beliefs are not ... invariably divisive or, 
much less, destabilizing."99 The United States itself is an example of 
a society that is not rigorously adhering to the ideal of public reason and 
excluding religious and other comprehensive doctrines from discourse in 
the public square. Yet, no great danger exists of a religious war being 
97. Gerald R. Dworkin, Equal Respect and the Enforcement of Morality, 7 Soc. 
PHIL. & PoL'Y 180, 193 (1990). See also JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS 221-22 (1980). 
98. See David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil 
Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 892-96 (1993). As Hollenbach has 
noted: 
[T]he Catholic tradition provides some noteworthy evidence that discourse 
across the boundaries of diverse communities is both possible and potentially 
fruitful when it is pursued seriously. This tradition, in its better moments, has 
experienced considerable success in efforts to bridge the divisions that have 
separated it from other communities with other understandings of the good life. 
. . . [T]hough the Church resisted the liberal discovery of modem freedoms 
through much of the modem period, liberalism has been transforming 
Catholicism once again through the last half of our own century. The memory 
of these events in social and intellectual history as well as the experience of 
the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council leads me to the hope 
that communities holding different visions of the. good life can get somewhere 
if they are willing to risk conversation and argument about these visions. 
Injecting such hope back into the public life of the United States would be a 
signal achievement. Today, it appears to be not only desirable but necessary. 
Id. at 891. 
99. Perry, Further Thoughts, supra note 18, at 714. 
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ignited among factions within the United States.100 As Michael Sandel 
has noted: 
It is always possible that learning more about a moral or religious doctrine will 
lead us to like it less. But the respect of deliberation and engagement affords 
a more spacious public reason than liberalism allows. It is also a more suitable 
ideal for a pluralist society. To the extent that our moral and religious 
disagreements reflect the ultimate plurality of human goods, a deliberative mode 
of respect will better enable us to appreciate the distinctive goods our different 
lives express.101 
Furthermore, as was previously mentioned, there are a host of issues 
arising in the area of "noncomprehensive morality" that might result in 
great social instability. 102 Therefore, if one's goal is to minimize 
social stability or refrain from coercing individuals on the grounds of 
beliefs to which they could not reasonably consent, then the practice of 
focusing merely upon the use of religious and other comprehensive 
doctrines as grounds for public justification or choice is questionable. 
100. See Smolin, supra note 67, at 1094 ("The prospect of a truly destructive 
'religious war' in America, such as existed in Europe, or exists in Northern Ireland, is 
extremely unlikely.") (footnotes omitted). 
101. Sandel, supra note 66, at 1794. See also Jeremy Waldron, Religious 
Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 841-42 (1993). 
Waldron has enumerated the costs of restricted debate as follows: 
Id. 
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which they are bound 
to disagree-and how could any doctrine of public deliberation preclude 
that?-it does not follow that such exposure is pointless or oppressive. For 
one thing, it is important for people to be acquainted with the views that others 
hold. Even more important, however, is the possibility that my own view may 
be improved, in its subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a 
metaphysics that I am initially inclined to reject. . . . I mean to draw attention 
to an experience we all have had at one time or another, of having·argued with 
someone whose world view was quite at odds with our own, and of having 
come away thinking, "I'm sure he's wrong, and I can't follow much of it, but, 
still, it makes you think ... " The prospect of losing that sort of effect in 
public discourse is, frankly, frightening-terrifying, even, if we are to imagine 
it being replaced by a kind of "deliberation" that, in the name of "fairness" or 
"reasonableness" ( or worse still, "balance") consists of bland appeals to 
harmless nostrums that are accepted without question on all sides. This is to 
imagine open-ended public debate reduced to the formal trivia of American 
television networks. . . . [This] might apply to any religious or other 
philosophically contentious intervention. We do not have (and we should not 
have) so secure a notion of public consensus, or such stringent requirements 
of fairness in debate, as to exclude any view from having its effect in the 
marketplace of ideas. 
102. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, even if one accepts the value of treating individual citizens as 
"free and equal" and according them the respect that is their due as 
citizens, whether this entails either some principle of neutrality or 
restraining oneself from utilizing· beliefs that are not publicly accessible 
or which form part of one's own comprehensive doctrine in making 
political choices and giving political justifications, is unclear. 103 What 
exactly is entailed by treating citizens as "free and equal" could certainly 
be a matter of debate and might differ depending upon the given society 
or time. 104 Furthermore, to argue that coercion is never justified 
absent some sort of consensus among the members of society is 
questionable. 105 As I argue in Part VI, viewing citizens as free and 
equal probably entails some notion of being a tolerant listener-of 
refraining from compounding social instability in the face of individuals 
who desire to utilize their own nonpublic reasons in making political 
choices and in giving political justifications. The status· of refraining 
from using nonpublic reasons in public justification and choice as a 
moral duty entailed by viewing citizens as being "free and equal" is 
controversial and arguably leads to a decrease in the citizen's ability to 
exercise his own autonomy and to base his own actions upon beliefs that 
may be his most strongly held. Yet, the moral duty of being a tolerant 
listener is certainly less controversial and less problematic in terms of 
restricting an individual's reasonable exercise of autonomy. 
V. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL EQUIVALENCE OF RELIGIOUS AND 
NONRELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS 
Rawls's theory is based upon a form of epistemic abstinence. He does 
not claim that his political conception of justice is true, but rather that 
his theory is "reasonable," in order to avoid the political conception of 
justice possessing the status of another comprehensive doctrine 
itself. 106 Furthermore, he abstains from passing upon the truth or 
falsity of any comprehensive doctrine-doctrines are merely judged as 
being reasonable or unreasonable. Rawls denies that "being reasonable" 
is "an epistemological idea," although he admits that it has 
103. See Perry, Further Thoughts, supra note 18, at 714 ("Political choices that 
cannot be defended without relying on religious beliefs do not invariably deny to those 
who reject (or 'reasonably' reject) the beliefs the respect due them as fellow citizens, as 
'free and equal' persons, or simply as human beings."). 
104. See Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 689 (noting that different resolutions may 
be more appropriate for liberal democracies depending upon the time and place in which 
these societies exist). 
105. See Gardbaum, supra note 54, at 1366. 
106. See Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case for Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 3, 20-27 (1990). 
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epistemological elements.107 Rawls characterizes being reasonable as 
"part of a political ideal of democratic citizenship that includes the idea 
of public reason."108 
However, as already noted, Rawls's theory is open to either the 
criticism that his political conception of justice is just another compre-
hensive doctrine packaged in the guise of reasonableness, or that it at 
least privileges certain comprehensive doctrines. 109 As Michael Perry, 
among others, has noted, secular neutralists unfairly disadvantage 
religious believers because such individuals are able "to rely on only 
some of [their] relevant beliefs, not including the most important ones: 
[their] religious convictions about human good," while others are able 
to "rely on all or most of [their] relevant beliefs."110 Although Rawls 
declines to label himself a neutralist in every sense of the term, his 
theory arguably remains vulnerable to Professor Perry's indictment. 
Therefore, even Rawls (although he would deny it), by assuming certain 
values and commonly shared "reasonable" premises that do not include 
religious premises, is privileging certain comprehensive doctrines over 
others. 
As Larry Alexander has noted, religious justifications are not 
epistemologically inferior111 or different from nonreligious justifica-
tions. 112 Some might argue that religious beliefs or other comprehen-
sive doctrines are not sufficiently certain to justify their coercive 
107. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 62. 
108. Id. 
109. See, e.g., Perry, Further Thoughts, supra note 18, at 712 (observing, in a 
related context, that "no neutral justification of . . . neutrality may be available; it may 
not be possible to defend ... neutrality without relying on controversial moral beliefs"). 
110. PERRY, supra note 7, at 14-15. See also Perry, Further Thoughts, supra note 
18, at 716-17 ("By privileging some controversial moral beliefs, or some controversial 
bases for controversial moral beliefs, and de-privileging others, any exclusivist ideal of 
the middle ground inevitably creates two classes of citizenship ... those citizens some 
of whose most basic such beliefs are de-privileged are relegated to 'second class' 
citizenship.") (footnote omitted). 
111. Professor Perry has come to the same conclusion. See Perry, Further 
Thoughts, supra note 18, at 715. Robert Audi also acknowledges that religious 
arguments are not epistemically inferior to nonreligious ones. Audi, supra note 1, at 
697-98. However, he still argues for the "sociopolitical ascendancy of secular argument 
in justifying coercion." Id. at 697. 
112. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 789-90; see also KENT R. GREENAWALT, 
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 57-76 (1988) (observing that religious 
beliefs can rest on the same forms of evidence and reasoning as nonreligious beliefs); 
Raz, supra note 106, at 3. 
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impos1t10n, or that these beliefs are not "generally accessible"113 in 
some sense. Greenawalt, in advancing the latter view, argues that the 
inaccessibility of religious convictions is a result of their being based on 
experiences that are not "fully accessible to others."114 This _inaccessi-
bility involves a lack of replicability for all members of society. 115 
Greenawalt argues that such beliefs are based upon experiences that are 
not available to all members of society. He distinguishes such inaccessi-
ble grounds for belief from certain types of accessible grounds including 
"philosophic arguments for God," "particular evidence in the stream of 
human history," and what Greenawalt terms the "fruits of convic-
tion."116 Greenawalt also distinguishes, as being publicly accessible, 
claims of mathematics and science and perhaps the central claims in 
political philosophy from religious beliefs. 117 However, Alexander has 
responded that liberalism "cannot claim as a ground for excluding 
religion from public policy questions a superior or even a different 
epistemology from that of religion."118 Alexander has presented his 
113. Steven Smith has made the following observation concerning "accessibility": 
"Accessibility," it turns out, has little to do with the beliefs, values, and 
reasons that the actual citizens in a democracy do in fact understand and use. 
. . . Complex scientific calculations and abstruse philosophical notions may 
be "accessible" even though ordinary citizens may find them foreign or 
implausible, but religious values that are widely accepted (and understood even 
by many citizens who do not accept them) are not. "Accessibility" becomes 
little more than an appealing catchword denoting the theorists' preferred mode 
of political discourse. 
Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment 
Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1015 (1989). 
114. Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 649; see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, 
Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 
347, 352 (1995) (arguing that "constitutionalists must deal with the practical tension 
between reason and revealed truth; they cannot theorize it out of existence") (footnote 
omitted). Eisgruber elaborates: "Reasons cease to be publicly accessible when they 
invoke a privileged connection to truth. Some religious reasons will be publicly 
inaccessible because they depend upon direct communication between the deity and 
some person, or limited group of persons." Id. at 364 (footnote omitted). 
115. Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 658-59. 
116. Id. at 650-51. 
117. Id. at 664. 
118. Alexander, supra note 7, at 765 (footnote omitted). Alexander argues as 
follows: 
My point is that if liberalism is correct and illiberal religious views, 
therefore, are incorrect, then liberalism is correct not by virtue of its operating 
in a separate epistemological domain, one in which it does not have to meet 
the evidence supporting illiberal religious views head-on. No meta-
epistemological vantage point exists from which it is possible both for illiberal 
religious views to be correct and also for liberalism to be correct that imposing 
correct religious views is unfair in some trumping way . . . . 
Id. at 785 n.50; see also Patrick Neal, A Liberal Theory of the Good?, 17 CAN. J. PHIL. 
567, 577-79 (1987) (discussing the attempt ofliberal theories to establish themselves on 
1606 
[VOL. 34: 1571, 1997] Illiberalism 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
own version of liberalism, which he views as "just a sectarian view on 
the same level as the religious and other views that it purports to be 
neutral about and to tolerate."119 Thus, Alexander argues that liberal-
ism (at least his version of liberalism) is merely another comprehensive 
doctrine, in the terminology of Rawls, and not some overarching 
meta-theory. Alexander calls liberalism the '"religion' of secularism," 
indicating its status as just another comprehensive doctrine on the same 
epistemological level as traditional religious doctrines.120 
This conclusion concerning the epistemological equivalence of 
religious and nonreligious beliefs is important because it is at odds with 
liberal theories that attempt to privilege nonreligious beliefs. One's 
beliefs might change over time as one decides to hold certain beliefs to 
obtain greater internal consistency, for aesthetic reasons, or by some 
other process that is entirely random. Perhaps no two individuals in 
society hold any belief in common. This is a logical possibility for 
which Rawls's theory does not account. What if there can be no 
overlapping consensus? Why does one assume that there will be an 
overlapping consensus consisting of nonreligious beliefs and not 
religious beliefs? 
Distinguishing between faith and reason is difficult. 121 Individuals 
such as Charles Larmore have argued that beliefs that are derived from 
the sciences are in some sense superior to other beliefs because they 
"can in principle be satisfied on the basis of experimental evidence 
which must itself conform to scientific requirements."122 Such views, 
however, fail to recognize that modern science, like a house of cards, is 
founded ultimately upon certain beliefs that are accepted upon nothing 
more than what may properly be termed faith. For example, two 
particular scientific propositions, one general and one more specific, are 
a different epistemological level from comprehensive theories of the good). Greenawalt 
has recently maintained that "[u]nderstood in a certain way, [he] agree[s] with Larry 
Alexander's claim about the unity of epistemology." KENT R. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE 
CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 102 (1995). However, he still maintains that 
"some claims of truth are self-consciously less subject to interpersonal evaluation than
are others." Id. 
119. Alexander, supra note 7, at 764. 
120. Id. at 790. 
121. See generally WILLIAM P. ALSTON, FAITH, REASON, AND SKEPTICISM: ESSAYS 
(Marcus Hester ed., 1992) (discussing the lack of a distinction between faith and reason). 
122. Charles Larmore, Beyond Religion and Enlightenment, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
799, 802 (1993). 
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seemingly based on what can be characterized only as faith. The first 
is the doctrine of causation-that the repeated observation of the 
constant conjunction of two events, A and B, with A always preceding 
B, justifies the conclusion that if event A occurs, event B will follow. 
Thus, observation of this phenomenon is said to justify the conclusion 
that "A causes B." If the occurrence of the constant conjunction of A 
and B is observed frequently enough, the proposition that A causes B 
might achieve the status of a "law" of science. However, as Hume has 
demonstrated, 123 this law of causation cannot be justified based upon 
"reason." Hume termed the notion that there is a necessary connection 
between two events as a "sentiment or impression" that arose within 
human beings after repeatedly observing that two events always seemed 
to be conjoined. Hume summarized the phenomenon as follows, noting 
that no such sentiment or impression arose from a single observation: 
In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that 
produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or 
necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same 
object is always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the 
notion of cause and connexion. We then feel a new sentiment or impression, 
to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object 
and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we 
seek for. For as this idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not 
from any single' instance, it must arise from that circumstance, in which the 
number of instances differ from every individual instance. But this customary 
connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which 
they differ. In every other particular they are alike. The first instance which 
we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls . . . is 
exactly similar to any instance that may, at present, occur to us; except only, 
that we could not, at first, infer one event from the other; which we are enabled 
to do at present, after so long a course of uniform experience.124 
123. See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in 35 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 470-78 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., 1952). 
124. Id. at 477-78 (emphasis in original). Elsewhere, Hume restates these points 
at greater length: 
The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the 
shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event. was 
connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has 
observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be 
connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of 
connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his 
imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance 
of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with 
another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, 
and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's 
existence: A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems 
founded on sufficient evidence. 
Id. at 476. 
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One might equally say that B causes A, because the two events are 
constantly conjoined-does it matter that event A precedes B? 
Furthermore, it is unclear that any process of reasoning could result in 
the conclusion that the law of causation is "true." How can one reason 
that in the future every observation of A will be followed by an 
observation of B unless one makes a "leap of faith" and assumes the law 
of causation to be true or one bases one's reasoning upon unstated 
premises that also may be based only on faith? 
A second example, one that is more specific than the first, is the 
second law of thermodynamics. According to the second law of 
thermodynamics, the universe constantly tends toward a state of greater 
disorder, or greater entropy. Thus, collectively the universe is 
constantly becoming more and more disordered over time. This "law" 
of thermodynamics is based upon the observation of a number of 
experiments, always resulting in greater disorder. However, like the law 
of causation, there is no process of "reason" that might be used to justify 
the conclusion that the second law of thermodynamics is true. One 
cannot automatically extrapolate from past observations to future 
predictions. Thus, one can only conclude that individuals adopt their 
belief in the second law of thermodynamics through a process that is 
seemingly indistinguishable from the religious person's adoption of the 
belief that God exists. Both require a "leap of faith," or adherence to 
certain unsupported (and arguably insupportable) premises. Therefore, 
those who seem to privilege the conclusions of scientific "reasoning," 
including Rawls, are in error if their claim is that somehow nonreligious 
beliefs, and scientific beliefs in particular, are based upon a different or 
superior epistemological foundation. Thus, as Alexander has noted, 
characterizing religious beliefs as being based upon "faith," while 
characterizing nonreligious beliefs as being based upon "reason," 
undercuts the argument for allowing religious discourse in the public 
square. 125 
This argument is equally applicable to beliefs concerning morality. 
Scott Idleman has illustrated the point as follows: 
125. Alexander, supra note 7, at 769-70. For an example of a view characterizing 
religious beliefs as being based upon faith, while characterizing nonreligious beliefs as 
being based upon reason, see Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating 
Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 987-94; Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously 
Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 938-42 (1989). 
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[C]onsider the presumptive equality or intrinsic worth of all human beings-the 
very cornerstone of modem civil rights. As a normative starting point, this 
presumption is widely shared and largely not open to debate for a majority of 
people in the United States today. Yet, can such a starting point actually be 
derived from "human experience" alone? The answer is emphatically no. At 
some point, one or more nonprovable normative propositions must enter the 
calculus. No matter how much data one collects, no matter how much 
deductive logic one performs, the answer is still no. 126 
Idlem.an has argued that the inaccessibility of religious beliefs may be 
generated by government policies excluding religious beliefs from public 
school curricula.127 Thus, fortuitous circumstance more than necessity 
causes religious beliefs to be less accessible to some members of society. 
Moreover, as Idleman has argued, such barriers to accessibility also exist 
in other areas of the "social or physical sciences, history, the arts and 
humanities, contemporary geopolitics, or simply the jargon and 
intricacies of the legal and political processes."128 . With any complex 
or unstudied discipline, problems of accessibility will arise. However, 
these are not problems of inherent inaccessibility defying practical 
solution, as some have claimed. 
VI. PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATNE MODEL OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
The views of Rawls and others, who argue that certain comprehensive 
doctrines should not form the grounds for dialogue concerning funda-
mental political questions, are not the only possible theories that might 
be termed "liberal" theories. This Part proposes an alternative inclusivist 
liberal theory under which religious and other comprehensive beliefs 
could be used as grounds for public justification and choice. By (1) 
reconceiving the nature of public discourse as a constantly fluctuating 
series of subdialogues within the public square, or by (2) focusing upon 
the moral rights and duties of the listener in a liberal society, one may 
fashion a liberal theory of public discourse in which religious and other 
comprehensive beliefs are utilized to enrich public dialogue without 
contributing to social instability. These proposals are not necessarily 
dependent upon each other-both might separately contribute to 
facilitating the use of religious and other comprehensive doctrines as 
grounds for public justification and choice. In addition, these proposals 
avoid the concomitant problems of social instability and subjecting 
126. Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene's 
Theory of the Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 349 (footnote omitted). 
127. Id. at 345-46. 
128. Id. at 346. 
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individuals to governmental coercion based on premises to which they 
cannot reasonably assent. 
A. Reconceiving the Nature of the Public Square 
Most of the liberal views concerning discourse in the public square 
advanced by modern theorists envision public discourse as being 
composed of a single debate among the members of society conceived 
of as free and equal· citizens. This view of the public square may be 
deduced, in part, by the fact that in any given public policy debate (at 
least at the national level) a single outcome will be achieved because 
there is but a single vote on any given issue. This logic, however, is 
flawed since a single outcome does not imply either that the debate over 
the outcome is a unitary one involving all of the members of society or 
that there is but a single rationale justifying the outcome. Conceivably, 
one could envision the public square as encompassing a variety of 
subdialogues among groups of individuals who happen to share certain 
premises in common. Depending upon the subject of dialogue, the 
composition of these groups might change as individuals find themselves 
holding certain sets of premises in common with certain individuals at 
one time and other sets of premises in common with different individuals 
at another. Thus, the public square might be envisioned as being 
comprised of a variety of shifting and changing groups engaged in 
dialogue concerning a variety of public issues. In situations in which 
premises are not shared among individuals (which may be infrequently 
given the nature of inaccessibility, which is arguably fortuitous rather 
than necessary129), dialogue might still be engaged in among individu-
als, but it would not necessarily be of the persuasive variety. Such a 
dialogue would merely be designed to inform others concerning the 
nature of their unshared premises and to attempt to discern other 
premises that might be shared. Potentially, an argument may be 
constructed based upon shared premises to which two parties might give 
their assent in situations in which there exist other unshared premises 
upon which equally cogent arguments justifying the same position might 
be constructed. 
Even if certain premises are not shared, the conclusions reached by 
individuals might be identical. For example, one could imagine two 
129. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. 
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individuals, one religious and one not, coming to the conclusion that 
abortion is morally wrong and therefore should be regulated in some 
manner by the state. Similarly, with less controversial issues there is 
often more than one rationale justifying a particular policy choice. In 
order to understand the manner in which each individual reached his or 
her conclusion, each must engage the other in an informative dialogue. 
This type of dialogue does not necessarily have as its object persuading 
the other party to adopt one's views or the premises that underlie these 
views, but rather is designed as a means both of better understanding 
each other as free and equal citizens and fostering the value of tolerance 
within society for viewpoints other than one's own. 
For the choice to be authoritative, only a concurrence in the result and 
not the rationale is necessary. The possible rationales or justifications 
might be based upon either private or public reasons. There likely will 
be many possible justifications based on public reasons as well as many 
justifications based on different comprehensive grounds. In the abortion 
context, for example, one individual might desire that restrictions be 
placed on abortions because that individual is Catholic and abortion is 
against the teachings of the Catholic Church. Another might argue that 
abortion shows an undesirable lack of respect for human life. Another 
might argue that a larger population is desirable and, therefore, 
restrictions should be placed on abortions. One can imagine a number 
of other possible justifications for restrictions on abortion, both public 
and comprehensive. Similarly, a number of justifications, both public 
and private, that support removal of all restrictions on abortions also 
exist. What is important is not thejustification, but rather the outcome. 
Treating citizens as "free and equal" members of society necessitates 
allowing them to reach an outcome based upon whatever justifications 
they find convincing. No matter what the rationale, their choice should 
be respected. 
1. A "Madisonian" Conception of the Public Square 
One might well term this model of public discourse a "Madisonian" 
conception of the public square. As Madison noted in Federalist 10, 
factions, 130 including factions based upon a "zeal for different opinions 
130. Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 17 
(James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981). 
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concerning religion,"131 may contribute to "instability, injustice, and 
confusion."132 Particularly in democratic societies, such as the United 
States, the danger exists that a faction representing the majority of the 
citizenry will be driven (out of self-interest) to oppress minorities, 
resulting in injustice as well as instability. For example, such a faction 
may be composed of religious sects that wish to foist their concept of 
religion upon the rest of society, including the nonreligious members of 
society. According to Madison, however, the remedy is not found in 
constraining liberty, but rather through designing structural mechanisms 
that channel self-interest and prevent oppression. Madison stated that 
there were two methods by which the danger of factions might be 
controlled: (1) "by destroying the liberty which is essential to [their] 
existence," and (2) "by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the 
same passions, and the same interests."133 Arguably, liberal models 
such as that of Rawls take the first approach. They impose a moral duty 
of self-restraint upon individuals engaging in discourse in the public 
square. True, this is not a legal duty, and therefore arguably does not 
destroy any part of the liberty of the citizenry. However, as I argue in 
Part VII, the inconsistency in Rawls's theory is the failure to make his 
principle of conversational self-restraint binding as a legal duty as well 
as a moral duty. Although constitutional essentials such as equal 
protection are enforced through legal duties backed by coercive political 
power, the most fundamental political value, Rawls's liberal principle of 
legitimacy, remains a mere moral duty. 
Furthermore, if citizens feel compelled as a moral duty to refrain from 
utilizing religious or other comprehensive doctrines as grounds for public 
justification or choice, arguably their liberty has been constrained in a 
meaningful sense. The liberty of the listeners in society may also be 
constrained because with less information comes a decreased number of 
options.134 This result seems to be at odds with liberalism itself. As 
Madison noted over two centuries ago: 
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than 
the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which 
it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is 
131. Id. at 18. 
132. Id. at 16. 
133. Id. at 17. 
134. See infra section VI.B. l. 
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essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish 
the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to 
fire its destructive agency. 135 
Thus, Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy is not an optimal means of 
maintaining stability within society. In his attempt to prevent individuals 
from being subject to governmental coercion based upon premises to 
which they cannot reasonably assent, he arguably has trampled upon the 
liberties of all. If structural mechanisms could be designed to lessen the 
problem of such governmental coercion (if it is a problem at all), then 
surely these mechanisms would be superior to any infringement upon the 
liberty of the citizenry. 
2. Structural Solutions to the Coordinate Problems of 
Faction and Instability 
Madison provided powerful insights into the dynamics of faction 
within societies of different sizes and compositions. Madison distin-
guished between two cases: (1) the case of a faction comprised of less 
than a majority of society, and (2) the case of a faction comprised of a 
majority of the society. In the first case, Madison stated that "relief is 
supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to 
defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, 
it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask 
its violence under the forms of the Constitution."136 Thus, factions 
that do not constitute a majority of the population are less worrisome 
than those that are comprised of a majority. In the latter case, Madison 
stated that "[w]hen a majority is included in a faction, the form of 
popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its 
ruling passion or· interest both the public good and the rights of other 
citizens."137 Madison thought that the cure for this danger lay in a 
republican form of government in which the powers of government were 
delegated to a small number of citizens elected by the whole society 
rather than a democracy wherein the majority governs. 138 Such a 
structural barrier to a majority faction's capturing the government is a 
superior alternative to Rawls's liberty-infringing solution. Other 
structural mechanisms such as separation of powers, checks and 
balances, and a federal system can similarly be implemented by liberal 
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 17 (James Madison) (Roy P.' Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 
1981). 
136. Id. at 19. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 20-21. 
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democratic societies to check the power of factions. 139 Many liberal 
theorists tend to view religious factions as more dangerous than other 
types of factions because, in part, they view religious beliefs as 
epistemologically different from nonreligious beliefs. 140 Whether this 
is true or not, such structural mechanisms may be used to curb both the 
threat of religious factions as well as all other potential factions. 
Madison's insight, that the danger of a faction comprised of a majority 
of the members of the society may be checked through institutional 
design and that a faction comprised of a minority of the members of 
139. Unlike Professor Eisgruber, I do not count "demographic diversity, commer-
cialism, and the public school system" among the structural mechanisms that represent 
a barrier to factions. Eisgruber, supra note 114, at 350. First, none of these elements 
of society seems to be constitutionalized. What provision of the United States 
Constitution, for example, authorizes the creation of a public school system? Certainly, 
James Madison would not have thought that any system of public education was a 
structural constitutional mechanism for controlling factions such as separation of powers 
or federalism. Second, these institutions do not necessarily provide structural barriers 
to the oppressive exercise of power by factions. A faction that gained control of the 
public school system, for example, instead of being inhibited by that control, would use 
it as a means of oppression. Third, commercialism seems to be the philosophy of a 
distinct faction within society. Substituting one faction's oppression for another's is not 
an example of a structural mechanism for preventing the oppressive exercise of political 
power. Finally, demographic diversity seems to be the very definition of faction. 
However, Eisgruber argues that what he terms "Madison's Wager" protects against the 
oppressive exercise of political power by religious factions through such "structural 
mechanisms," as well as through other constitutional principles: 
Id. 
Madison's Wager negotiates that tension [between religion and a constitution 
committed to reason] through a two-part strategy. It relies heavily on 
structural features of the Constitution to diminish the threat that religions will 
form damaging factions. These structural features include demographic 
diversity, commercialism, and the public school system. As a secondary but 
nonetheless important measure, the Constitution establishes doctrines calculated 
to inhibit government support for mainstream religions while permitting 
policies that nurture peripheral religions. The public school system figures 
prominently in the doctrinal as well as the structural components of the wager 
140. See supra Part V. For example, Professor Eisgruber has stated: 
Not only is religion a source of factions, it is a source of exceptionally virulent 
factions. Three features distinguish religious factions from ordinary factions. 
First, because religious factions reject reason's authority in principle, they are 
less subject to persuasion. They need not defend their actions on the basis of 
premises shared by, or even comprehensible to, the larger polity. 
Second, religious communities are often more cohesive than other interest 
groups .... 
Third, religious factions not only resist persuasion, they resist compromise. 
Eisgruber, supra note 114, at 372. 
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society is less dangerous in a democratic society where the majority 
governs, m.ay be applied to the problem. of religious discourse in the 
public square. In a pluralistic society com.posed of a variety of interests, 
the danger of a majority faction causing social instability is lessened. 
Thus, as the pluralism. of a society increases, the likelihood that social 
instability or injustice will arise as a result of conflict among religious 
factions decreases. Furthermore, the threat that a dominant faction 
com.prised of the majority of the members of society will arise also 
decreases. Therefore, Rawls's model seemingly is faced with the 
following paradox: Rawls states that the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
leads to instability within society as individuals are subject to political 
coercion based upon justifications that they cannot reasonably accept. 
However, as pluralism. increases, according to Madison, the likelihood 
of instability due to faction is decreased. The resulting conclusion is 
that the more pluralistic the society, the less is the need for a principle 
of conversational self-restraint such as Rawls's liberal principle of 
legitimacy. Madison notes that the degree of plurality is a function of 
the size of society: 
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and 
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more 
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the 
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass 
within which· they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute 
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety 
of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole 
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a 
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover 
their own strength and to act in unison with each other. 141 
Therefore, if we accept Madison's analysis, Rawls's liberal principle of 
legitimacy seems to be particularly inappropriate for a large, pluralistic 
society such as the United States, in which no single faction is likely to 
become powerful enough to disrupt the stability of the society. The 
contradiction in Rawls's model is that it dictates that as pluralism. 
increases, there is a greater need for some principle of conversational 
self-restraint. As Madison's argument illustrates, however, the opposite 
is true-as pluralism. increases, a principle of conversational self-restraint 
is less needed in order to check social instability. 
141. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 22 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 
1981). 
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3. The Problem of Coercion Based Upon Unshared Premises 
In addition to facilitating social stability, this model of public 
discourse avoids the problem of exercising coercive political power 
against individuals who cannot reasonably consent to the justification 
given for the exercise of such power. Under this model, there may be 
multiple justifications for a given political policy arising from different 
subdialogues occurring in the public square. This is a more realistic 
model of the public square since it is unlikely that an overlapping 
consensus will be achieved among the reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines of the members of society such that the many and varied 
political questions arising in modem liberal democratic societies will 
receive a definitive answer. 
Members of society are free to engage in public discourse within a 
subdialogue that is based upon premises that they share. Thus, they are 
free to pick justifications for coercive governmental actions to which 
they can give their assent. Within a single subdialogue, an outcome will 
be produced. Not all individuals within the subdialogue may agree with 
the outcome, but the members could reasonably assent to the outcome 
because it is based on premises that they share. Does the fact that a 
majority have other grounds for the outcome matter? Under Rawls's 
model based on a unitary public dialogue, if there were two possible 
public justifications for an outcome and one was a minority view while 
the other was a majority view, Rawls would not conclude that the 
minority was being unjustly coerced. Therefore, analogously in the case 
of subdialogues, whether within a given subdialogue there may be 
majority and minority justifications for a given outcome, or whether 
between subdialogues there may be different justifications for the same 
outcome, should not matter. 
The range of possible justifications will be expanded since legitimate 
justifications are not limited only to those based on public reasons or an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, but may 
also include justifications based upon religious and other comprehensive 
doctrines. Therefore, there is less need for concern over exercising 
coercive political power over individuals who cannot reasonably assent 
to any grounds upon which the exercise of this political power is 
justified. The fact that members of society cannot reasonably assent to 
the same justification for a coercive governmental action is immaterial. 
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The important point is that all members of society can reasonably assent 
to at least one such justification-the justification arising from the 
subdialogue in which they have participated. 
Consider a fictitious, but plausible, debate over whether or not to go 
to war with a belligerent nation that has recently engaged in hostilities 
with a weaker nation with which we have some ties (trade, strategic 
interests, members of the society have emigrated to our country and have 
become citizens leaving relatives behind, etc.). Several potential 
subdialogues may be envisioned. Those who have economic interests in 
seeing the weaker nation protected to prevent trade disruption may argue 
for declaring war on the belligerent nation. Such individuals may value 
wealth above all else and have no desire to debate the moral or other 
ramifications of going to war with the belligerent nation. Dialogue 
among such individuals may not even touch upon such issues. A second 
group may be concerned only with the strategic interests of our nation 
and desire a declaration of war in order to protect these interests. Such 
individuals may touch on some of the economic issues tangentially while 
engaging in a dialogue concerning what course of action is advisable. 
However, they too may be wholly unconcerned with the moral 
ramifications of a declaration of war. Other individuals may have closer 
ties to the weak nation. They may have been born in the country, and 
for sentimental reasons might not wish to see it overrun. They may be 
wholly ignorant as well as apathetic concerning the strategic or economic 
consequences of a declaration of war. For them, these are not the most 
fundamental concerns, and they may have no desire to engage in such 
a debate. Finally, another group may be intensely religious. They may 
care only to discuss what the tenets of their religion dictate concerning 
such a war. To them, all other debate may be irrelevant. Their religion 
may understand the killing of human beings to be a great evil. 
However, they may recognize an exception for a "just war." Debate 
may center around whether such a doctrine is applicable in this particular 
situation. 
The dialogic process described above is to a certain extent an artificial 
construction. In the real world, individuals will often have multiple 
concerns relevant to a given public policy debate. Because the extent of 
inaccessibility and unshared premises among members of society is 
greatly overestimated, it is likely that many individuals in society will 
share the same concerns, based on similar premises. Thus, they will 
have a desire to participate in several of these subdialogues. Further-
more, new subdialogues that encompass more than a single concern or 
comprehensive doctrine will arise. For example, some of the 
subdialogues may contain both religious and secular arguments. Finally, 
some individuals may participate in subdialogues based upon premises 
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they do not accept or to which they assign a lesser value in an attempt 
to persuade others on their own terms. In the scenario above, for 
example, those originally hailing from the weaker nation may attempt to 
make economic arguments to those concerned with wealth maximization, 
strategic arguments to those concerned with strategic considerations, and 
religious arguments to those who value religion most highly. 
By allowing individuals to choose the subdialogues in which they 
participate instead of artificially constraining them to participation in a 
single dialogue based on premises they do not accept, the autonomy of 
all members of society is enhanced, and individuals are accorded the 
respect that is their due as "free and equal" members of society. Thus, 
this model should be attractive to those who advocate an 
autonomy-based comprehensive liberalism as well as those (such as 
Rawls) who believe that viewing all members of society as being "free 
and equal" is inherent in a theory of political liberalism. 142 
One might argue that this is merely a modus vivendi143 and, there-
fore, is less stable than Rawls's model. However, it is not at all clear 
that a mere modus vivendi is inherently less stable than Rawls's political 
142. As Professor Gardbaum has noted, the difference between comprehensive 
liberalism and political liberalism may only be in the justification for liberalism-the 
content of liberalism may be the same under both comprehensive liberalism and political 
liberalism. Gardbaum, supra note 35, at 387. As Professor Gardbaum observes, 
"[p]olitical liberalism simply privatizes the pursuit of autonomy: It does not allow 
autonomy (or any other controversial ideal) to become the 'established church' of the 
liberal state." Id. However, Gardbaum himself believes that the debate between 
comprehensive and political liberalism is not merely about the justification for liberalism 
but also concerns the "content and scope of neutrality." Id. at 396 (emphasis added). 
143. According to Professor Michelman, an agreement is a mere modus vivendi 
when: 
[E]ach party regards the agreement as strictly instrumental to some good of his 
or hers apart from any good found in the agreement itself. In a modus vivendi, 
the agreement has no intrinsic, noninstrumental value; parties participate in it 
to further their own ulterior interests. Contrast this case in which the parties 
regard participation in the agreement as good. for them for its own sake, as, 
say, a moral good. 
Michelman, supra note 38, at 1828. Arguably, an agreement produced through a process 
of subdialogues is not a modus vivendi since individuals within society may recognize 
it as a great good that other individuals, as well as themselves, may rely on their most 
fundamental beliefs as justification for coercive governmental actions. They may view 
the fact that there exist many possible justifications for a common outcome as a great 
good in itself. Even Michelman admits that it "is not so apparent ... why people would 
find intrinsically valuable their participation in a social consensus over principles to 
regulate the basic structure of their society." Id. at 1829. 
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conception of justice. Furthermore, this model may be based upon a 
political conception of justice founded upon toleration and the moral 
rights and duties of the listener in a liberal society. Such a political 
conception of justice is discussed in greater detail in Part VI.B. A 
political theory representing a "great good in itself' (as opposed to a 
mere modus vivendi) arguably will result in greater social stability, and 
does not suffer from the drawbacks and inconsistencies of Rawls's 
theory. 
This model of the public square is more realistic than that of Rawls 
because it does not require social consensus. upon every significant 
political issue, but still results in social stability. It is more likely that 
citizens will engage in subdialogues with fellow citizens who share 
certain fundamental beliefs than it is that an overlapping consensus of 
all reasonable comprehensive doctrines can be obtained. Furthermore, 
this model is more consistent with the expectations and desires of 
citizens engaging in public discourse. Citizens do not expect that such 
an overlapping consensus will be achieved, nor do they desire such 
consensus if it means they cannot rely on certain of their most 
deeply-held beliefs as grounds for public justification and choice. As 
Scott Idleman has noted: "Who, after all, genuinely enters political or 
legal debate with the purpose or expectation of achieving ontological 
harmony, or in the absence of such harmony, of either undergoing some 
sort of value transformation or exacting such a transformation from 
another participant in the debate?"144 By not requiring consensus 
concerning the beliefs constituting grounds of justification for every 
political choice, this model avoids the practical problem of achieving a 
result based upon an overlapping consensus of the reasonable doctrines 
of members of society. Furthermore, this model is more consistent with 
the expectations of individuals comprising a liberal democratic society. 
B. The Moral Rights and Duties of the Listener in a Liberal Society 
The fact that liberal theories, such as that of Rawls, focus upon the 
duties of the speaker in public dialogue illustrates the lack of focus upon 
the liberal value of toleration that is a feature of such theories. An 
example is Robert Audi's description of the effect of exercising coercive 
power based on grounds that are not publicly accessible: 
If I am coerced on grounds that cannot motivate me, as a rational informed 
person, to do the thing in question, I cannot come to identify with the deed and 
will tend to resent having to do it. Even if the deed should be my obligation, 
still, where only esoteric knowledge-say, through revelation that only the 
144. Idleman, supra note 126, at 353. 
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initiated experience-can show that it is, I will tend to resent the coercion. And 
it is part of the underlying rationale of liberalism that we should not have to 
feel this kind of resentment-that we give up autonomy only where, no matter 
what our specific preferences or particular world view, we can be expected, 
given adequate rationality and sufficient information, to see that we would have 
so acted on our own. 145 
Audi merely assumes that resentment will be engendered on the part of 
those who are coerced based on justifications with which they cannot 
agree. He further assumes that such resentment is the fault of the 
individual or individuals offering justifications for their positions and not 
the fault of the individual feeling the resentment. Audi, however, is 
quick to argue that individuals who might feel resentment when not 
allowed to employ in political discourse views derived from their own 
comprehensive doctrines, which might be their most strongly held views, 
have no genuine complaint. According to Audi, it is inconsistent with 
liberalism for individuals to rely. on their own comprehensive views in 
public discourse-if anyone feels resentment at having to refrain from 
exercising this measure of autonomy, then it is their own problem. 
As an alternative to the liberal theories of individuals such as Rawls 
and Audi, one could begin from the viewpoint of the listener and ask 
what are the moral rights and duties of a listener in a liberal society. 
Surely the listener is under a duty to tolerate the views of others 146 
(even if the views are in some way disrespectful), because a premise of 
liberal theories such as that of Rawls is that individuals must be viewed 
as free and equal citizens. 147 By not resorting to violence or exacer-
bating social instability upon hearing discourse that one finds offensive 
(because it is based upon a comprehensive doctrine that one does not 
145. Audi, supra note 1, at 690. 
146. Lawrence Solum, in arguing for a principle of including public reasons in 
advocating coercive public policy choices, which would allow the use of nonpublic 
reasons as long as public reasons were given, insists that there is a "duty to listen with 
respect and tolerance for these views." Solum, supra note 6, at 749-50. For this reason, 
Solum concludes that the principle of inclusion is more effective in "fostering the civic 
virtue of tolerance and thus indirectly supporting the value of civility." Id. at 750. 
147. See Sandel, supra note 66, at 1794 (noting that there may be different ways 
of conceiving the equal respect owed to fellow citizens in a liberal society: "On a 
different conception of respect - call it the deliberative conception-we respect our 
fellow citizen's moral and religious convictions by engaging, or attending to 
them-sometimes by challenging and contesting them, sometimes by listening and 
learning from them-especially if those convictions· bear on important political 
questions."). 
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share), one is practicing the liberal value of toleration and, thereby, 
fostering the growth of social unity. Thus, listeners who do not share 
the particular comprehensive view have a duty to tolerate justifications 
based on that view. Other listeners, however, who share the comprehen-
sive view or who merely wish to obtain information concerning 
justifications based upon comprehensive doctrines they do not share have 
a moral right to such information. Such information may enhance the 
autonomy of individuals within society by providing further options for 
justification of coercive governmental actions that they may wish to 
adopt. 148 Alternatively, viewing individuals as being "free and equal" 
necessitates that one allow them to receive information concerning 
alternative justifications for coercive governmental action-whether 
based on public or comprehensive reasons. 149 Such information 
enables citizens to participate in the political process as "free and equal" 
members of society. 
Certain purposes of engaging in public discourse are better served by 
allowing individuals to resort to nonpublic reasons. For example, 
Jeremy Waldron_ has observed that there are many purposes in engaging 
in public debate. Among these are to "convince, persuade, communi-
cate, to open one's mind to other perspectives, hear what others are 
saying, remind them of things they may have overlooked, exchange 
experiences, proverbs, images, and insights."15° Furthermore, by 
allowing religious or other comprehensive beliefs to serve as grounds for 
public justification, new "constructive possibilities of consensus and 
community" might emerge "from challenging received moral tradi-
tions."151 Many of these purposes would be better served if nonpublic 
reasons were allowed into the public square accompanied by a moral 
duty of toleration on the part of the listener, who does not share the 
comprehensive beliefs, than if such reasons were excluded from all 
public discourse. 152 As Michael Sandel has noted, Rawls's ideal of 
148. See infra section VI.B.l. 
149. See infra section VI.B.2. 
150. Waldron, supra note 101, at 834. 
151. Cohen, supra note 95, at 1541. 
152. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 35, at 389 (arguing that liberals must 
ultimately talce moral conflict seriously, rather than seeking in vain to overcome it; they 
must appreciate the extent to which liberalism contributes creatively to moral diversity, 
rather than simply reacting to it). Professor Gardbaum has stated: 
[C]onsensus is not generally the condition of autonomy; rather, autonomy is 
more typically exhibited in divergence of substantive (or first-order) views. 
It is to be expected (and encouraged) that autonomous citizens will affirm very 
different conceptions of the public and private good. Conflict over competing 
answers to questions of public importance should be viewed as the expected, 
desired, and characteristic result of a free, democratic society in which people 
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public reason is "an unduly severe restriction that would impoverish 
political discourse and rule out important dimensions of public delibera-
tion."153 
As previously mentioned, there are at least two bases upon which a 
listener's right to information may rest. One could argue either (1) that 
allowing listeners to receive information concerning potential justifica-
tions for coercive governmental actions enhances the autonomy of the 
listeners by providing them whit a greater range of choices concerning 
pursue their own ideas and ways of life. Far from being pathological, as 
proponents of "community" often see it, plural and conflicting outcomes to 
vigorous debates about conceptions of the public good and how best to live are 
the expression of a healthy and vibrant democratic society. 
Stephen A Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 
386-87 (1993). 
Similarly, republican writers, such as Cass Sunstein, often refer to the process of 
subjecting private interests to public scrutiny. Unlike Professor Gardbaum, these writers 
seem to think that the result of such a process of deliberation will be consensus: 
The republican belief in deliberation counsels political actors to achieve a 
measure of critical distance from prevailing desires and practices, subjecting 
these desires and practices to scrutiny and review. 
To say this is not to suggest that deliberation calls for some standard entirely 
external to private beliefs and values (as if such a thing could be imagined). 
The republican position is instead that existing desires should be revisable in 
light of collective discussion and debate, bringing to bear alternative 
perspectives and additional information. Thus, for example, republicans will 
attempt to design political institutions that promote discussion and debate 
among the citizenry; they will be hostile to systems that promote lawmaking 
as "deals" or bargains among self-interested private groups; they may well 
attempt to insulate political actors from private pressure; and they may also 
favor judicial review designed to promote political deliberation and perhaps to 
invalidate laws when deliberation has not occurred. 
Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 74, at 1548-49 (footnotes omitted). Thus a 
principle of conversational self-restraint, such as that of Rawls, may inhibit the critical 
examination of the comprehensive doctrines of individual members of society. This 
effect of Rawls's theory is potentially undesirable as it may lead to both a reduction in 
the autonomy of the members of society by depriving them of the ability to consider and 
adopt alternatives, as well as the persistence of individuals' holding certain beliefs that 
in the long run may prove detrimental, both to themselves and to the rest of society. As 
Sunstein has noted, "[s]ometimes the appeal to civic virtue is designed to improve 
individual character-a particularly important theme in classical republican thought. But 
modem republicans invoke civic virtue primarily in order to promote deliberation in the 
service of social justice, not to elevate the character of the citizenry." Id. at 1550-51. 
Sunstein argues that this process of political deliberation "is designed to ensure that 
political outcomes will be supported by reference to a consensus ( or at least broad 
agreement) among political equals." Id. at 1550. Thus, such a process may also 
facilitate social unity. 
153. Sandel, supra note 66, at 1776. 
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political justification, or (2) that viewing citizens as being "free and 
equal" members of society entails allowing them to receive information 
concerning political justification, whether based on public or comprehen-
sive grounds, so they may fully participate in the political process. 
Concerns related to both of these rationales are the maintenance of the 
democratic political process, 154 as well as social· stability. Both of 
these rationales have been discussed with respect to the debate over the 
meaning of the First Amendment. 155 However, such principles may 
also be discussed in the abstract as political principles of modern liberal 
democratic societies. 156 Although constitutional essentials such as 
freedom of speech may not be absolutes, the fact that Rawls's liberal 
principle of legitimacy clashes starkly with the political principle of 
freedom of expression seems to be a defect of his theory. 
I. The Autonomy of the Listener 
Several commentators have noted that one important justification for 
a political principle of freedom of speech is that such a principle 
increases the autonomy of listeners by offering them a wider range of 
options concerning political justification. Although a principle of 
154. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION-
AL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and 
Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. 
REV. 299 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971). 
155. C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First 
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 304 (1982) [hereinafter Baker, The Process of 
Change]; C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA 
L. REV. 964, 964 (1978) [hereinafter Baker, Scope of the First Amendment]; Martin H. 
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Paul G. Stem, Note, 
A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and its Relation to Public Discourse, 99 
YALE L.J. 925, 934 (1990). 
156. See William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 
847 (1993) (stating that an "epistemological attack on religion suggests a hierarchy of 
beliefs that is inconsistent with First Amendment Speech Clause jurisprudence, which 
posits that all ideas are equal") (footnote omitted). Michael Perry has emphasized the 
importance of the free exercise norm: 
[T]o disfavor religious arguments relative to secular ones would violate the 
core meaning-the antidiscrimination meaning-of the free exercise norm. 
After all, included among the religious practices protected by the free exercise 
directive are bearing public witness to one's religious beliefs and trying to 
influence political decisionmaking on the basis of those beliefs. 
PERRY, supra note 1, at 734 (footnote omitted). However, it would seem that a 
voluntary principle of conversational self-restraint would not violate the First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom from government abridgment of speech. This Article 
presents the position that the same arguments used to justify a principle that forbids the 
government from abridging the freedom of speech of members of liberal democratic 
societies, also justify abandoning any principle of conversational self-restraint. 
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conversational self-restraint arguably restricts the autonomy of listeners 
not only with respect to options concerning public justification, but also 
with respect to options for individual self-definition, 157 here we are 
concerned primarily with political justification. For example, Martin 
Redish has argued that a political principle of freedom of expression is 
justified by two basic values: individual self-rule and individual 
self-development. Redish argues that these values are in a sense more 
fundamental than a justification in terms of facilitating the democratic 
process because these are the values that justify the democratic process 
itself. 158 Full autonomy may only be exercised under conditions of 
perfect knowledge as well as perfect freedom. Therefore, the more 
information available to an individual, the greater will be his ability to 
exercise his power of choice. 159 Similarly, Stephen Gardbaum has 
157. As Paul Stern has noted: 
We engage in ... public discussion not only about matters of common 
political interest central to the project of self-government, but also about 
matters of overlapping individual interest having to do with the persuasiveness 
of those religious, philosophical, moral, aesthetic, and personal ideals that 
shape the contours of our own self-conceptions. The end of this discourse is 
not to master the collective challenge of governing a democratic polity but to 
master the individual challenge of governing ourselves, that is, to define 
deliberatively those values, ideals and conceptions of the good that set the 
terms by which each of us organizes his own life. We single out certain forms 
of expression (for example, scientific-philosophical,. literary, and aesthetic 
expression) for special constitutional protection because only by so doing can 
the integrity and independence of this debate be secured from arbitrary state 
intrusion in a way that parallels the independence of political debate. 
Stern, supra note 155, at 929. Thus, a principle of conversational self-restraint may be 
more injurious to individual autonomy than merely acting as a barrier to options 
concerning political justification. Such a principle may serve to significantly inhibit the 
autonomous development of the identities of all of the members of society. 
158. Redish, supra note 155, at 593-94, 601-05. A corollary to Redish's position 
concerning the justification of a principle of freedom expression is that no principled 
distinction can be made between different kinds of speech. Id. at 627-35. 
159. Although perfect information is an unattainable goal, it is, nevertheless, a goal 
toward which individuals should strive: 
We can't be fully free without having perfect knowledge, nor acquire perfect 
knowledge unless we live in conditions of complete freedom. Our "real 
interests" are those we would form in such conditions of perfect knowledge 
and freedom. Although we can be in a position to fully recognize our "real 
interests" only if our society satisfies the utopian condition of perfect freedom, 
still, although we do not live in that utopia, we may be free enough to 
recognize how we might act to abolish some of the coercion from which we 
suffer and move closer to "optimal conditions" of freedom and knowledge. 
The task of a critical theory is to show us which way to move. 
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argued that a principle of conversational restraint such as Rawls's liberal 
principle of legitimacy poses a "barrier to autonomy" of listeners in a 
liberal democratic society. 160 Professor Gardbaum reasons that "[b ]y 
artificially constraining . . . discussion in the political sphere by 
reference to the neutral norms of 'public reason,' . . . political liberalism 
creates an important barrier to autonomy . . .. "161 A principle of 
conversational self-restraint, such as Rawls's liberal principle of 
legitimacy, denies listeners in society access to justifications for coercive 
political choices. This principle, therefore, acts to restrict the autonomy 
of these individuals by cutting down on the range of options available 
to them. 
The idea that a political principle of freedom of speech helps to 
further the autonomy of the listener in a liberal democratic society is not 
new. For example, two of the four fundamental values that Thomas 
RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRJTICAL THEORY 206 (1981). 
160. Gardbaum, supra note 35, at 385. This argument also has been made by Paul 
Stern, whom Professor Gardbaum quotes: 
[W]e can freely and intelligently exercise our freedom of choice on fundamen-
tal matters having to do with our own individual ideals and conceptions of the 
good only if we have access to an unconstrained discussion in which the 
merits of competing moral, religious, aesthetic, and philosophical values are 
given a fair opportunity for hearing. 
Stern, supra note 155, at 934. 
161. Gardbaum, supra note 35, at 401. Other individuals have also focused on the 
development of the listener as a rationale justifying a political principle of freedom of 
speech. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment, supra note 155, at 964; Martin 
H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Baker, The 
Process of Change, supra note 155, at 304 (arguing that "[t]he key normative content, 
which is the most persistent and fundamental aspect of liberalism, exalts the values of 
human equality, self-determination,, and self-realization, that is, of liberty and autono-
my"). Professor Gardbaum has noted the importance of vigorous debate on public issues 
for the development of individual autonomy: 
[T]he importance of vigorous debate on public issues cannot be defended 
exclusively (or even mainly) on the grounds of consensus. Rather, such debate 
is necessary for a healthy democracy, and a healthy democracy is itself an 
important ingredient for the attainment of individual autonomy in society. 
Democratic societies encourage autonomous individuals to flourish. A 
democratic political system is valuable in part because it is the necessary 
political condition of living autonomously: it is extremely difficult to be an 
autonomous individual without being an autonomous citizen. In order to be 
an autonomous citizen, it is necessary to have a wide array of options from 
which to choose. Robust debate and real conflict about public issues is 
essential if political choices are to be free, but not because this is the (only) 
way to arrive at a consensual outcome. A citizen does not exercise autonomy 
only when she "backs the winner" and agrees with the outcome, but generally 
when she exercises a meaningful choice in the political arena. A political 
system enhances autonomy when its processes enable its citizens to exercise 
meaningful choice, and not only when the outcomes of those processes happen 
to converge. 
Gardbaum, supra note 152, at 387-88. 
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Emerson identified as justifying a principle of freedom of expression are 
seemingly concerned with autonomy. Although Emerson may well have 
been thinking in terms of the autonomy of the speaker, his arguments 
may be extended to the autonomy of the listener because dialogue is a 
two-way process involving speakers as well as listeners, who in turn 
become speakers. One of the values justifying a principle of freedom of 
expression identified by Emerson has to do with the search for "truth." 
According to Emerson: 
[F]reedom of expression is an essential process for advancing knowledge and 
discovering truth. An individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all 
sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it 
to opposition, and make full use of different minds. . . . The reasons which 
make open discussion essential for an intelligent individual judgment likewise 
make it imperative for rational social judgment.162 
A related value identified by Emerson has to do with individual 
self-fulfillment: 
[F]reedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual 
self-fulfillment. The proper end of man is the realization of his character and 
potentialities as a human being. For the achievement of this self-realization the 
mind must be free. Hence suppression of belief, opinion, or other expression 
is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature .... 
To cut off [man's] search for truth, or his expression of it, is to elevate society 
and the state to a despotic command over him and to place him under the -
arbitrary control of others. 163 
Therefore, both Emerson's value of "truth" as well as his value of 
"self-fulfillment" indicate a concern with autonomy. Thus, at least 
certain justifications for a principle of freedom of speech are closely 
related to a concern with enhancing the autonomy of the listener in a 
liberal democratic society. Such justifications for a principle of freedom 
of speech seem to be at odds with Rawls's liberal principle of legitima-
cy, which acts as a barrier to the development of the autonomy of the 
listeners in society. 
This first rationale justifying a principle of freedom of speech is 
closely related to the second, in that denying individuals the ability to 
162. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970). 
See also Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First 
Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 745-47 (1977) [hereinafter Emerson, Colonial 
Intentions]. 
163. EMERSON, supra note 162, at 6. See also Emerson, Colonial Intentions, supra 
note 162, at 744. 
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act fully autonomously may undermine respect for the members of 
society. 164 Therefore, denying individuals the ability to act autono-
mously may be inconsistent with viewing them as being "free and equal" 
members of society, in Rawls's parlance. The process of political 
deliberation, through which individuals are exposed to possibilities for 
public justification for coercive governmental actions, is inhibited by a 
principle of conversational self-restraint such as Rawls's liberal principle 
of legitimacy. 165 Such a principle, therefore, is incongruent with the 
political value of individual autonomy upon which some comprehensive 
liberalisms are based. 
2. The Listener as a "Free and Equal" Member of Society 
The second rationale for respecting a right of access to information on 
the part of the listener in a liberal democratic society rests on viewing 
citizens as being "free and equal" members of society. This rational is 
seemingly related to the value placed on public debate by civic 
republican writers such as Cass Sunstein166 and Frank Michelman.167 
164. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
19-22 (1984); Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic 
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. 
REV. 267, 281 (1991) (stating that "censorship of the expression of opinion stunts the 
individual's growth as a human being and shows disrespect for the individual's ability 
to make her own informed decisions"); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine in part because of the public's 
right to receive information). 
165. As Paul Stem has observed with respect to the dialogic process in general: 
Talking and listening to others allows us to weigh the value and merits of rival 
forms of life and conceptions of the good, and thus it makes possible a 
considered exploration of the range of valuative alternatives. Through 
discourse with others we can situate ourselves within the horizon of competing 
values and thus deliberatively choose how we want to deploy our faculties. 
This ultimately requires us to define what kind of life we want to live, what 
types of activities we want to attach value to, and what sort of persons we 
want to be. Speaking with others about their rival values and ideals is thus 
constitutively linked to the possibility of an individual agent exercising a 
deliberative choice of how she wants to live. 
Stem, supra note 155, at 935-36. 
166. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 244 
(1993) ("Most ambitiously, we might hope that a well-functioning system of free 
expression will ultimately encourage a degree of public virtue and produce high levels 
of participation and genuine deliberation.") (endnote omitted). Sunstein has described 
the nature of deliberative democracy as follows: 
We might understand the American constitutional system to create a 
deliberative democracy; This is a system that combines a degree of popular 
accountability with a belief in deliberation among representatives and the 
citizenry at large. The system is not designed solely to allow the protection 
of private interests and private rights. Even more emphatically, its purpose is 
not to furnish the basis for struggle among self-interested private groups. That 
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To function as "free and equal" members of society and to fully 
participate in the democratic political process, citizens need access to 
information concerning the possible justifications. for ,coercive govern-
mental actions. Whereas under the autonomy rationale, one might argue 
that an individual's autonomy in general, not just their autonomy with 
respect to political decisionmaking, is diminished if they are not allowed 
access to information concerning possible justifications for the exercise 
of coercive political power, here it is even more salient that the type of 
speech that is at issue is fundamentally political speech.168 
With respect to this second rationale, traditional defenses of a political 
principle of freedom of speech may be relevant. Again, to find an 
argument counseling against conversational self-restraint in public 
discourse, we need look no further than the writings of James Madison 
who declared.that "a popular government, without popular information, 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; 
or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a 
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with 
notion is anathema to American constitutionalism. 
Instead, the system is intended to ensure discussion and debate among 
people who are differently situated, in a process through which reflection will 
encourage the emergence of general truths. A distinctive feature of American 
republicanism is hospitality toward heterogeneity, rather than fear of it. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 255, 313 (1992) (footnotes 
omitted). 
167. Frank L Michelman, Law's Republic, 91 YALE L.J. 1493, 1524-32 (1988) 
(describing a "process of personal self-revision under social-dialogic stimulation"). 
168. Alon Harel has noted the unique nature of political speech: 
Political discourse is unique. Its protection contributes not only to the 
quality of political discourse, but also to the legitimacy of political decisions 
and, in particular, to the legitimacy of political obligations. The freedom 
granted to individuals to express and deliberate political issues grants 
legitimacy to the use of the state's coercive power. Thus, while some forms 
of valuable political deliberation may take place in repressive societies, such 
deliberation cannot legitimately determine the content of political obligations. 
Excluding some ideas or values from the political process, even if those ideas 
and values are less valuable, not only endangers the quality of the output of 
the political process, but also undermines the legitimacy of state coercion. 
Ideas emerge from the political process clothed with legitimacy (and thereby 
justifying political obligations) only because they have emerged from an open 
and fair procedure. 
Alon Harel, Free Speech Revisionism: Doctrinal and Philosophical Challenges, 74 B.U. 
L. REV. 687, 696 (1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF FREE SPEECH (1993)). 
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the power which knowledge gives."169 This rationale for the political 
principle of freedom of speech has also been enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court: 
The constitutional right of free expression . . . is designed and intended to 
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the 
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, 
in the hope that· use. of such freedom will ultimately produce more capable 
citizenry and a more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach 
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which 
our political system rests. 170 
The notion that information is essential to political participation is 
widely accepted and, therefore a principle of freedom of speech is 
justified in liberal democratic societies. 
In addition, the justification for protecting all speech that is relevant 
to public decisionmaking given by Alexander Meiklejohn is applicable 
in the context of religious discourse in the public square. In Political 
Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People, Meiklejohn argued 
that the members of the political community were in need of all relevant 
information concerning public decisionmaking because they were the 
true "governors" in a republic society. 171 Meiklejohn thus proceeded 
from the perspective of the listener in a liberal democratic society. 
According to Meiklejohn, the most important factor is not the right of 
the speaker or the speaker's autonomy, but rather the importance of 
providing information to the community of listeners. 172 Meiklejohn, 
169. Letter from J. Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed., 1910). 
170. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). See also Board of Educ., Island 
Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) ("[T]he right to receive 
ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights 
of speech, press, and political freedom.") (emphasis added); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 
438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Powell, JJ., dissenting) ("It is 
not sufficient ... that the channels of communication be free of governmental restraints. 
Without some protection for the acquisition of information about the operation of public 
institutions ... , the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be 
stripped of its substance.") (footnote omitted); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("[W]here a 
[ willing] speaker exists, . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its 
source and to its recipients both."). 
171. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 154, at 26-27. According to Meiklejohn: "We, the 
People, acting together, either directly or through our representatives, make and 
administer law. We, the People, acting in groups or separately, are subject to the law." 
Id. at 15. 
172. Id. at 26-27. 
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for example, argued that "[ w ]hat is essential is not that everyone shall 
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."173 
Thomas Emerson identified a similar rationale for protecting freedom 
of speech. Emerson argued that freedom of expression was to be 
protected because it serves four fundamental values. Two of these 
values, truth and self-fulfillment, seem to involve notions of individual 
autonomy. However, the other two values seem to be tied more to a 
conception of citizenship that is present in the work of modem civic 
republican scholars. One of these values is political participation by the 
citizenry: 
[F]reedom of expression is essential to provide for participation in decision 
making by all members of society. . . . Once one accepts the premise of the 
Declaration of Independence-that governments "derive their just powers from 
the consent of the governed" -it follows that the governed must, in order to 
exercise their right of consent, have full freedom of expression both in forming 
individual judgments and in forming the common judgment.174 
Emerson also identified stability as a value served by the political 
principle of freedom of expression: 
The system [ of freedom of expression] is a form of social control that strikes 
a balance in society between stability and movement, thereby allowing for 
necessary change without resort to violence. It shields the community from 
sterility and stultification, allows society to test proposed new measures in the 
realm of ideas and discussion before committing itself to actual trial and error, 
and provides a legitimizin? process for reaching hard, and to some participants 
objectionable, decisions. 17 
173. Id. at 26. 
174. EMERSON, supra note 162, at 7. See also Emerson, Colonial Intentions, supra 
note 162, at 743-44. 
175. Emerson, Colonial Intentions, supra note 162, at 742-43. See also EMERSON, 
supra note 162, at 7. Kent Greenawalt, who has argued that legislators should refrain 
from offering religious justifications for coercive political policy decisions, has also 
acknowledged that freedom of expression leads to social stability: 
Desirable accommodations [of competing interests and desires] are more likely 
if accurate assessments are made of interests and desires, and communication 
serves this purpose. Few societies are likely to bar the expression of personal 
feelings and attitudes that lead to acceptable accommodations in families and 
other small social units, but many do proscribe public discussion of significant 
points of view, and they pay some price in their ability to estimate relevant 
community sentiments. Failures of accommodation are often a source of social 
instability. Those who are resentful because their interests are not accorded 
fair weight, and who may be doubly resentful because they have not even had 
a chance to present those interests, may seek to attain by radical changes in 
existing institutions what they have failed to get from the institutions 
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These two values of political participation and stability not only mirror 
the work of modem civic republican scholars, but also seem. reminiscent 
of Rawls's work. To view citizens as "free and equal'' m.em.bers of 
society, they must be allowed to fully participate in the political process. 
This can be achieved best when the citizenry is provided with the 
broadest array of information concerning their role as political actors. 
Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy restricts citizens' access to such 
information and therefore seems to be inconsistent with viewing citizens 
as "free and equal" m.em.bers of society. 
Michael Perry has expressed a view similar to that of Emerson 
concerning the necessity of a political principle of freedom. of speech in 
a liberal democratic society. According to Perry: 
Political participation includes the activity of communicating information and 
ideas. Yet participation also includes, of course, the activity of evaluating 
public policy and performance, and there can be no meaningful evaluation 
without access to relevant information and ideas. Thus, both the governmental 
accountability and the political participation propositions require that the 
principle of freedom of expression be understood to forbid government to 
interfere with either communication of or access to information or ideas useful 
in evaluating public policy or performance.176 
In this case, the problem. is not one of governmental restrictions leading 
to the inaccessibility of information relevant to the decision-making 
function of the citizenry. Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy is 
merely a principle of conversational self-restraint. However, the 
negative effects of such a principle on the ability of citizens to 
participate in the political process in an informed m.anner177 make the 
themselves. Thus, liberty of expression, though often productive of divisive-
ness, may contribute to social stability. 
Kent R. Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 645, 672-73. 
176. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 
78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1137, 1144 (1983) (footnote omitted). Perry notes that "[t]he 
participation proposition requires protection for communication, however, not simply 
because interfering with communication (almost always) interferes with access, but also 
and independently because communication is a mode of political participation, and 
therefore interfering with communication interferes-necessarily interferes-with 
participation." Id. at 1145. 
177. In the context of governmental restraints on access to information, Professor 
Be Vier has contended: 
[G]overnmental denial of access to information poses a different kind of direct 
threat to speech than do punishment and censorship, and thus the forms of 
governmental activity directly implicate different values. Punishment or 
censorship directly undermine the value of free speech, while the denial of 
access to information undermines the value of well-informed speech. 
Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for a 
Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 499 (1980). Similarly, denial of access 
to information through conversational self-restraint undermines the value of 
1632 
[VOL. 34: 1571, 1997] Illiberalism 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
rationales for a principle of freedom of speech, unabridged by govern-
mental actions, equally applicable in the context of political discourse in 
the public square. From the point of view of the listener, which entity 
is responsible for limiting access to information is unimportant. 
Whether it be the government or individual citizens practicing Rawls's 
liberal principle of legitimacy, the result is the same. 
Rawls is therefore attempting to arrive at a result that would be 
inconsistent with common understandings of the political principle of 
freedom of speech through his liberal principle of legitimacy. He 
relegates this principle to the status of a mere moral principle of 
voluntary conversational self-restraint, rather than attempting to impose 
it as a legal duty incumbent upon all members of society backed by the 
threat of governmental use of force. If Rawls's liberal principle of 
legitimacy were legalized, common understandings of the political 
principle of freedom of speech would be more problematic. However, 
the same justifications given for such a principle support abandoning 
conversational self-restraint as a mere voluntary moral duty as well. 
Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy, therefore, is subject to the same 
objections, which he has not persuasively addressed. 
It is widely acknowledged that speakers in a liberal society have an 
equal right to express their views. As Sanford Levinson has argued: 
Why doesn't liberal democracy give everyone an equal right, without engaging 
in any version of epistemic abstinence, to make his or her arguments, subject, 
obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to reject the arguments should they be 
unpersuasive (which will be the case, almost by definition, with arguments that 
are not widely accessible or are otherwise marginal)?178 
However, listeners in a liberal society also have certain moral rights. 
For example, they may be entitled to access other individuals' compre-
hensive beliefs that they may find informative, persuasive, or compelling 
in exercising their right of public choice. By restricting the grounds 
upon which citizens can base public justification to merely public 
reasons, one may be violating this right of the listener in a liberal 
society. As Levinson has concluded, "[It] [i]s ... possible ... that this 
well-informed speech and is inconsistent with treating citizens as "free and equal" 
members of society. 
178. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 2061, 2077 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE 
OF RELIGION & MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)). 
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whole quest to discover legitimating criteria that will determine what 
types of discourse should be admitted into the public square is funda-
mentally misguided."179 I concur. 
C. An Objection Anticipated: Religious Discourse and the 
"Establishment" of Religion 
A possible objection to the proposals offered in this Article is that 
religion might be "established" within a liberal democratic society, thus 
violating a prohibition of establishment of religion, which is essential to 
a society's being considered "liberal."180 Under one form of this 
"nonestablishment" argument, merely offering religious arguments as 
grounds for political decisions may constitute a violation of the 
nonestablishment norm. This "exclusivist" position would bar religious 
discourse from entering into political decisionmaking altogether. There 
is, however, a second, more persuasive version of the nonestablishment 
argument. Under this "inclusivist" version, legislators would be 
prohibited from making a political decision based solely on religious 
grounds. They would be compelled to seek out alternative secular 
grounds for their political choice. In particular, Professor Perry has 
argued that, when legislators seek to base political decisions on purely 
religious grounds without offering alternative justifications, the 
establishment norm is violated. 181 Perry's view is as follows: 
179. Id. at 2077. 
180. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 195, 198 (1992) ("The bar against an establishment of religion entails the 
establishment of a civil order-the culture of liberal, democracy-for resolving public 
moral disputes."). But see Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 381 (1992) ("[I]t is occasionally suggested that the Establish-
ment Clause helps keep religion out of politics. Simply put, that is nonsense. As history 
clearly demonstrates, religion is always a part of politics."). Professor Perry has 
formulated the potential objection as follows: 
Although the nonestablishment norm, as I have explained, forbids any branch 
or agency of government to do certain sorts of things, it does not forbid any 
person-including any person who happens to be a legislator or other public 
official-to say whatever she wants to say, religious or not, in public political 
debate. The serious question, then, is not whether legislators or other public 
officials, much less citizens, violate the nonestablishment norm by presenting 
religious arguments in public political debate. The serious question, rather, is 
whether government would violate the nonestablishment norm by basing a 
political choice-for example, a law banning abortion-on religious argument. 
PERRY, supra note 1, at 734-35 (footnotes omitted). 
181. PERRY, supra note 1, at 14-30 (discussing the nonestablishment norm). 
Professor Perry has argued that the nonestablishment norm is applicable in the following 
manner: 
[T]he nonestablishment norm does forbid government to base political choices 
on religious arguments in this sense: Government may not base any 
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I said that under the nonestablishment norm,· government may not make a 
political choice about the morality of human conduct unless a plausible secular 
rationale supports the choice. But what about an individual legislator or other 
public official: What should she do? Should she vote to support a political 
choice about the morality of human conduct if she is agnostic about whether, 
or even skeptical that, a plausible secular rationale supports the choice, leaving 
it up to others, and ultimately to the courts, to decide if such a rationale exists? 
Fidelity to the spirit of the nonestablishment norm seems to me to require more 
of her: She should vote to support a political choice about the morality of 
human conduct only if, in her view, a persuasive secular rationale exists. 1 2 
However, both of these versions of the nonestablishment argument are 
subject to several counterarguments. 183 
The first response to such a claim is that nonestablishment of religion 
is not a principle that is inherent in liberalism. The United States is one 
of the few nations that actually prohibits "establishment" of religion via 
constitutional provision. Furthermore, even in the United States, at the 
time of ratification of the Constitution there were established religions 
m some of the states. 184 In the United States, therefore, 
action-therefore, it may not base any choice, including one about the morality 
of human conduct-on the view that a religious belief is closer to the truth or 
otherwise better than one or more competing religious or nomeligious beliefs. 
. . . The nonestablishment norm forbids government to base political choices 
on religious arguments; at least as an ideal matter, the nonestablishment norm 
requires that if government wants to make a political choice, including one 
about the morality of human. conduct, it do so only on the basis of a secular 
argument: an argument that relies neither on any religious belief nor on the 
belief that God does not exist. 
Id. at 33. 
182. Id. at 37. 
183. See id. at 35-37 (discussing Douglas Laycock's rejection of the 
nonestablishment argument); Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech that is Both Religious 
and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793 (1996) (arguing against the nonestablishment 
position and critiquing Perry's work). 
184. See WILBUR G. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 8-10 (1964). 
John Noonan has stated of the Establishment Clause: 
There had been nothing like it in history. You could, of course, find 
something like it in several of the colonies and something like it in Virginia 
after it threw off the British Crown, but the full embrace of both no 
establishment and free exercise was unique for a nation. 
John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free Exercise, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 567 (1992). 
Even the Establishment Clause, itself, might have been originally intended only as a 
nonestablishment directive applicable solely to the federal government, and not to 
government in general. For example, the term "respecting" in the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment may be interpreted to merely forbid federal interference with 
state establishment of religion. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a 
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nonestablishment seemingly was not a principle that was inherent in 
notions of liberal government. 
Second, depending upon what one understands "establishment" to 
mean, the proposals advocated in this Article may not amount to an 
establishment of religion. For example, the term establishment may be 
constrained to mean only compelling individuals to observe a certain 
religion. 185 If this is the case, allowing individuals to merely offer 
religious justifications for coercive governmental actions does not violate 
the nonestablishment directive unless the coercive governmental action 
happens to be forcing all of the citizens to observe a single religion. A 
principle of nonestablishment understood to forbid the use of religious 
reasons as grounds for coercive political policy choices is arguably not 
inherent in liberalism. Indeed, even if a legislator were to offer solely 
religious justification for a political choice, the justification would not 
seem to offend the nonestablishment principle, particularly if alternative 
justifications existed but were not voiced. Thus, a reasonable interpreta-
tion of nonestablishment would not seem to be in conflict with the 
proposals in this Article. 
Third, as has been noted, religious arguments are no different from 
any other form of comprehensive doctrine used to justify political 
decisions. There is no difference between a legislator relying on peculiar 
philosophical beliefs that are not shared by the populace as a whole and 
a legislator relying on religious beliefs that are not shared by all. Those 
who point to the nonestablishment norm, however, confine themselves 
to the legislator's use of religious beliefs as a foundation for justification 
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157 (1991). Arguably, the subject of religion was 
thought to be better left with the state governments as was the general police power (the 
ability to regulate for the public health, safety, and morals). 
185. This view of the nonestablishment directive is similar to Michael McConnell's 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause as prohibiting coercion. See Michael W. 
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 21 WM. & MARYL. REV. 
933, 938 (1986) ("It is difficult to see, on this evidence, how an establishment could 
exist in the absence of some form of coercion."). Professor Perry has argued against 
such narrow constructions of the establishment norm and, in particular, has addressed 
Douglas Laycock's arguments: 
For reasons having to do both with the central prohibition and meaning of 
the nonestablishment norm and with the importance of not exalting form over 
substance, I think Laycock's ground for rejecting my position is quite weak. 
The nonestablishment rule that Laycock emphasizes, against government 
compelling anyone to engage in an act of religious worship, is only an in-
stance-albeit, a very important instance-of a more general rule against 
government imposing one or another religion on anyone. For government to 
make a coercive political choice about the morality of human conduct that can 
be supported only by a religious reason or reasons is for government to impose 
religion. 
PERRY, supra note 1, at 36. 
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of political decisions. As has been discussed, a legislator inescapably 
will have. to rely upon beliefs derived from comprehensive doctrines to 
reach a conclusion concerning a variety of political decisions. Would 
the advocates of the "nonestablishment" position make similar arguments 
with respect to other comprehensive doctrines? If a legislator were to 
base a political decision upon comprehensive beliefs that were not shared 
by the populace at large, should that legislator also off er other grounds 
as an alternative foundation for the decision? Those advocating the 
"nonestablishment" position probably would not request alternative 
grounds of justification under these conditions. Thus, their position is 
inconsistent. Moreover, as has been noted, certain decisions inevitably 
seem to invoke reliance upon certain comprehensive doctrines. Under 
such circumstances, should the legislator be forced to offer as many 
alternative foundations as there are comprehensive doctrines held by 
members of society, or does the legislator need to offer only a single 
alternative foundation based on his own comprehensive doctrine? 
Requiring alternative justification ad infinitum is neither practical nor 
reasonably expected of legislators in a liberal society. 
Fourth, invoking the "nonestablishment" norm to require legislators to 
offer alternative grounds for their political decisions in situations in 
which these grounds are not the primary grounds upon which their 
decision is based, is disingenuous. Legislators arguably are under a 
moral imperative to be truthful and forthcoming in offering justification 
for their political choices. If legislators are morally compelled to offer 
alternative justifications that they themselves do not find particularly 
persuasive, even though they may be able to reasonably assent to those 
grounds, the imperative to remain truthful and forthcoming arguably is 
diminished. Even Professor Perry recognizes that any alternative secular 
argument offered by the legislator must be persuasive to the legisla-
tor.186 However, one must question what the legislator should do if he 
186. Professor Perry has stated the requirement as follows: 
The claim I want to develop and defend in this chapter is that in making a 
political choice about the morality of human conduct, neither legislators nor 
other public officials should rely on a religious argument about the require-
ments of human well-being unless an independent secular argument reaches the 
same conclusion about the requirements of human well-being. (The secular 
argument must be one that, in a legislator's or other public official's own 
view, is persuasive.). 
PERRY, supra note 1, at 66. 
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finds no secular reasons persuasive. Must the legislator vote against his 
religious convictions and vote for the position that he does not support? 
As a general rule, Perry contends that "[t]he nonestablishment norm 
forbids-properly forbids . . . -government, including the judicial 
branch, to rely on a religious premise in making a choice if no plausible 
secular premise supports the choice."187 However, Perry seems to 
recognize exceptions to this general rule. Indeed, Perry acknowledges 
that there may be no intelligible secular argument that supports the claim 
that every human being is sacred; therefore, as a matter of political 
morality, legislators and others may "rely on a religious argument that 
every human being is sacred whether or not any intelligible or persua-
sive or even plausible secular argument supports the claim about the 
sacredness of every human being."188 One wonders whether there are 
other such propositions that may not be supported by secular arguments 
or that in a legislator's own view are not supported by persuasive secular 
arguments for which it would be permissible to rely on solely religious 
grounds. Because exceptions are recognized, the inclusivist version of 
the nonestablishment argument becomes problematic.189 Moreover, 
members of society will not derive much comfort from alternative 
justifications offered by legislators when they know that they are acting 
under some sort of moral obligation to offer token alternative grounds 
for their political decision-making. Members of society will be aware 
that the legislator may assign almost no weight to the alternative grounds 
offered for public consumption, while in reality basing all 
decisionmaking on deeply held religious beliefs. Thus, the value of such 
a moral imperative and its ability to contribute to social stability are 
questionable. 
Finally, even if a principle of nonestablishment of religion is inherent 
in liberalism and even if such a principle is interpreted as being in 
conflict with the proposals in this Article, a principle of free exercise of 
religion is also inherent in liberalism. 190 Such a principle seems to 
indicate that both legislators and citizens be allowed to offer religious 
religions for political decisions. For example, advocates of an inclusivist 
view of public political debate, such as Professor Perry, acknowledge 
that the free exercise norm mandates that both citizens and legislators be 
187. Id. at 103 (footnote omitted). 
188. Id. at 69. 
189. See Laycock, supra note 183, at 804-05 (noting the importance of this 
exception in Perry's work). 
190. PERRY, supra note 1, at 12-14 (discussing the free exercise norm). 
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free to present religious or other arguments in public debate. 191 On the 
other hand, Professor Perry also states that legislators should offer 
nonreligious alternative grounds for political decisions to avoid violation 
of the nonestablishment norm. However, the free exercise norm not only 
indicates that citizens and legislators should be free to express their 
religious views in defending political decisions, but also dictates that 
they should not be compelled to offer alternative grounds that they find 
unpersuasive or less persuasive than the religious grounds they off er. 
The free exercise norm allows both citizens and legislators to express 
certain views and to be free from compulsion to express views that they 
do not wish to express. Therefore, there must be some ranking of the 
value placed upon these two principles. The proposals suggested in this 
Article privilege ( or at least give equivalent weight to) the free exercise 
of religion over any principle of nonestablishment of religion interpreted 
as forbidding the use of religious grounds as justification for coercive 
public policy choices. The critics of these proposals are left to argue for 
a privileging of a principle of nonestablishment over a principle of free 
exercise. 
VIL CONCLUSION: WHY ISN'T THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLE OF 
LEGITIMACY COERCIVELY ENFORCED? 
Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy is a moral principle. As Rawls 
has stated, the duty of civility that flows from the ideal of citizenship is 
a moral duty rather than a legal one. 192 Rawls does not seem to advo-
191. Professor Perry has noted: 
[D]oes a legislator violate the nonestablishment norm by presenting, in public 
debate about whether the law should recognize homosexual marriage, a 
religious argument that homosexual sexual conduct is immoral? An 
affirmative answer is wildly implausible. Every citizen, without regard to 
whether she is a legislator or other public official, is constitutionally free to 
present in public political debate whatever arguments about morality, including 
whatever religious arguments, she wants to present. Indeed, the freedom of 
speech protected by the constitutional law of the United States is so generous 
that it extends even to arguments, including secular arguments, that may not, 
as a constitutional matter, serve as a basis of political choice .... 
Id. at 32 (footnote omitted). 
192. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 217. The ideal of ecumenical political dialogue that 
Perry advanced in his work, Love and Power, was also limited as only a moral duty. 
Perry admitted that establishment of his dialogic virtues of fallibilism and pluralism as 
legal duties in participation in political dialogue might violate the Free Speech Clause. 
PERRY, supra note 7, at 140-41. However, one might well ask why one constitutional 
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cate that the liberal principle of legitimacy be enforced, like other moral 
principles that might be part of the overlapping consensus (such as 
"murder is wrong"), through coercion. The entire unity of society rests 
upon individual members within society following the liberal principle 
of legitimacy in public discourse and choice. If individuals in society 
do not adhere to the liberal principle of legitimacy in making public 
arguments and choices, the whole fabric of society may be tom apart, 
and society may fall into chaos. Rawls's reluctance to transform the 
liberal principle of legitimacy into a legal duty is peculiar because Rawls 
characterizes liberal political values as coming in two varieties: values 
of political justice, such as the value of equal political and civil liberty, 
and equality of opportunity and the values of public reason, such as the 
political virtues of reasonableness and a readiness to honor the duty of 
civility. 193 In Rawls's model, the former category is comprised of 
values that result in legal as well as moral duties, while values in the 
latter category seem to result in merely moral duties. 
The fact that Rawls does not assert that the duty of civility is a legal 
duty rather than merely a moral duty is an indication of the illiberal 
nature of Rawls's political liberalism. The fact that the ideal of public 
reason conflicts with one of the constitutional essentials that would be 
reached through an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines is evidence that there is something wrong with either the ideal 
of public reason or the constitutional essential of freedom of speech. 
Were Rawls to assert that the coercive power of the state should be used 
to enforce the duty of civility, his theory would quickly become 
offensive in the eyes of most liberals. Under Rawls's model, there is no 
persuasive reason for making the duty of civility merely a moral duty 
rather than a legal duty as well. 
Liberal theories in general, and Rawls's theory in particular, have 
sought to exclude religious and other comprehensive doctrines as 
grounds for public justification and choice. These theories, however, are 
based upon assumptions that are not clearly essential to all possible 
theories of public discourse that might be termed "liberal." Furthermore, 
even if one accepts these assumptions as a given, whether they 
necessitate that religious and other comprehensive views be excluded as 
essential, that of freedom of speech, should trump the most fundamental of political 
values-that of civility in public discourse. Liberal theories traditionally duck the 
answer to this question, giving no good reason why principles such as Rawls's duty of 
civility should not be made legalized norms of a liberal society. See Smolin, supra note 
67, at 1083 (arguing that the self censorship inherent in such liberal theories is 
"incompatible with the spirit of the Constitution"). 
193. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 224. 
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a basis for public justification and choice is unclear. Religious beliefs 
are epistemologically equivalent to the nonreligious beliefs that are 
constituent elements of Rawls's overlapping consensus. Finally, by (1) 
reconceiving the nature of the public square as composed of many 
separate subdialogues rather than a single dialogue among all of the 
members of society or by (2) focusing upon the moral rights and duties 
of the listener in a liberal society, one can construct a model of public 
discourse in which religious and other comprehensive beliefs are not 
excluded as a basis of public justification and choice. This approach 
would enhance the quality of public dialogue and further the liberal 
virtue of tolerance. Therefore, through this model and within the 
traditions of liberalism, one could resort to religious and other compre-
hensive doctrines as grounds for public justification and choice. Such 
a model would enrich public discourse by allowing a broader range of 
views to contribute to public debate which is not only desirable, but also 
necessary to the resolution of certain political issues. 
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